Polish PM: Israel had access to data on Polish opposition via Pegasus spyware haaretz.com/world-news/2026-…
— @haaretzcom Oct 12, 2026
Month: October 2026
#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad
9/11, the Second Intifada, and Mossad
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x.com/mikenov/status/2109634…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #Mossad and #Russian #Intelligence services: 1998 – 2003 – Google Search
Between 1998 and 2003, the relationship between Israel’s Mossad and Russian Intelligence services—primarily the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) and the FSB (Federal Security Service)—underwent a pragmatic transformation. Driven by the rise of Vladimir Putin (who took over the FSB in 1998 and the Russian presidency in 2000) and Efraim Halevy, who became the Director of Mossad in 1998, the agencies shifted from Cold War adversaries to cautious, transactional partners focused on shared geopolitical threats. [1, 2, 3, 4]
1. Counterterrorism and Islamic Extremism
The core driver of intelligence sharing during this window was a mutual concern over radical Islamist movements. [2, 5]The Chechen-Palestinian Parallel: Following the outbreak of the Second Chechen War in 1999 and a wave of terrorist bombings in Russia, Russian leaders explicitly linked Chechen rebels to Middle Eastern extremist networks. Israeli officials drew parallels between these groups and Palestinian militant organizations. [5]
Intelligence Exchange: Mossad and Russian intelligence secretly shared operational data regarding financial pipelines, training camps, and the movement of foreign fighters traveling between the Middle East and the North Caucasus. [2, 5]2. Monitoring Iran’s Weapons Programs
A major point of friction, but also engagement, was Russia’s relationship with Iran, particularly concerning the transfer of military and nuclear technology. [3, 6]Direct Consultative Mechanisms: In March 1999, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov (himself a former chief of the SVR) to establish a direct, bilateral channel to address technology leaks to Iran. [6]
Mossad’s Role: Under Halevy, monitoring Iran’s nuclear program was Mossad’s top priority. Mossad frequently provided the SVR and FSB with actionable intelligence showing how Russian entities or scientists were being actively targeted or co-opted by Iranian procurement agents, prompting Moscow to tighten export controls. [3]3. Managing Post-Soviet Transnational Organized Crime
The massive wave of over one million Soviet-Jewish immigrants arriving in Israel throughout the 1990s created an intrinsic domestic security link between Moscow and Tel Aviv. [2, 7]The “Russian Mafia” Threat: The porous boundaries of the post-Soviet landscape allowed transnational Eurasian organized crime syndicates to expand their footprints into Israel. [2]
FSB-Mossad Cooperation: To counter money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and cybercrime, Mossad worked alongside Israel’s Shin Bet to establish joint informational networks with Russia’s FSB to track high-profile criminal figures moving assets across international lines. [2]4. Defense Industry Collaboration
The era also laid the groundwork for robust military-technical intelligence agreements. Under a framework initialized in 1995, Israeli and Russian defense industries collaborated on upgrading older Soviet-era hardware (such as MiG fighter jets and tanks) for third-party export. [8]
This intelligence and technological proximity culminated in October 2003, when Israel and Russia finalized a landmark tripartite deal to supply India with specialized airborne early warning and control radar systems (PHALCON) integrated onto Russian aircraft bodies. [8]
Summary of the Dynamic
While both agencies maintained deep skepticism of one another—and actively monitored each other for domestic espionage—the 1998–2003 era proved that Mossad and Russian intelligence could compartments their geopolitical differences (such as Russia’s historic ties to Arab states) to exploit overlapping security interests in counterterrorism and global tracking. [2, 4][1] foreignpolicy.org.tr
[2] thegeopolitics.com
[3] mossad.gov.il
[4] youtube.com
[5] fdd.org
[6] jamestown.org
[7] youtube.com
[8] files.ethz.chMossad and Russian Intelligence services: 1998 – 2003 – Google Search google.com/search?q=Mossad+a…— https://x.com/mikenov/status/2109671299979120917
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 12, 2026
Responsibility for the September 11 attacks – Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Respon…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 12, 2026
In a January 2007 interview with the Portuguese newspaper Expresso, he stated that the world is “in the midst of a Third World War” with radical Islam, and predicted that it will take at least 25 years for the West to win.[9]
Efraim Halevy – Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Efraim…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 12, 2026
Vladimir Putin has proposed a one-day ceasefire for Ukraine to hold presidential elections.
The Russian president’s offer is a humiliation for Donald Trump, who claimed that Moscow had agreed a truce with Kyiv to halt strikes on energy infrastructure.
🔗: telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2…
— @Telegraph Oct 12, 2026
#Mossad and #Russian #Intelligence services: 1998 – 2003 – Google Search
Between 1998 and 2003, the relationship between Israel’s Mossad and Russian Intelligence services—primarily the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) and the FSB (Federal Security Service)—underwent a pragmatic transformation. Driven by the rise of Vladimir Putin (who took over the FSB in 1998 and the Russian presidency in 2000) and Efraim Halevy, who became the Director of Mossad in 1998, the agencies shifted from Cold War adversaries to cautious, transactional partners focused on shared geopolitical threats. [1, 2, 3, 4]
1. Counterterrorism and Islamic Extremism
The core driver of intelligence sharing during this window was a mutual concern over radical Islamist movements. [2, 5]The Chechen-Palestinian Parallel: Following the outbreak of the Second Chechen War in 1999 and a wave of terrorist bombings in Russia, Russian leaders explicitly linked Chechen rebels to Middle Eastern extremist networks. Israeli officials drew parallels between these groups and Palestinian militant organizations. [5]
Intelligence Exchange: Mossad and Russian intelligence secretly shared operational data regarding financial pipelines, training camps, and the movement of foreign fighters traveling between the Middle East and the North Caucasus. [2, 5]2. Monitoring Iran’s Weapons Programs
A major point of friction, but also engagement, was Russia’s relationship with Iran, particularly concerning the transfer of military and nuclear technology. [3, 6]Direct Consultative Mechanisms: In March 1999, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov (himself a former chief of the SVR) to establish a direct, bilateral channel to address technology leaks to Iran. [6]
Mossad’s Role: Under Halevy, monitoring Iran’s nuclear program was Mossad’s top priority. Mossad frequently provided the SVR and FSB with actionable intelligence showing how Russian entities or scientists were being actively targeted or co-opted by Iranian procurement agents, prompting Moscow to tighten export controls. [3]3. Managing Post-Soviet Transnational Organized Crime
The massive wave of over one million Soviet-Jewish immigrants arriving in Israel throughout the 1990s created an intrinsic domestic security link between Moscow and Tel Aviv. [2, 7]The “Russian Mafia” Threat: The porous boundaries of the post-Soviet landscape allowed transnational Eurasian organized crime syndicates to expand their footprints into Israel. [2]
FSB-Mossad Cooperation: To counter money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and cybercrime, Mossad worked alongside Israel’s Shin Bet to establish joint informational networks with Russia’s FSB to track high-profile criminal figures moving assets across international lines. [2]4. Defense Industry Collaboration
The era also laid the groundwork for robust military-technical intelligence agreements. Under a framework initialized in 1995, Israeli and Russian defense industries collaborated on upgrading older Soviet-era hardware (such as MiG fighter jets and tanks) for third-party export. [8]
This intelligence and technological proximity culminated in October 2003, when Israel and Russia finalized a landmark tripartite deal to supply India with specialized airborne early warning and control radar systems (PHALCON) integrated onto Russian aircraft bodies. [8]
Summary of the Dynamic
While both agencies maintained deep skepticism of one another—and actively monitored each other for domestic espionage—the 1998–2003 era proved that Mossad and Russian intelligence could compartments their geopolitical differences (such as Russia’s historic ties to Arab states) to exploit overlapping security interests in counterterrorism and global tracking. [2, 4][1] foreignpolicy.org.tr
[2] thegeopolitics.com
[3] mossad.gov.il
[4] youtube.com
[5] fdd.org
[6] jamestown.org
[7] youtube.com
[8] files.ethz.chMossad and Russian Intelligence services: 1998 – 2003 – Google Search google.com/search?q=Mossad+a…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 12, 2026
efraim halevy – Google Search google.com/search?gs_ssp=eJz…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 12, 2026
Mossad at the time of 9/11 – Google Search google.com/search?q=Mossad+a…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 12, 2026
#Israel #September11 #ArielSharon
Israel at the time of 9/11
At the time of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Israel was governed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and was deeply embroiled in the Second Intifada, a period of intense and violent conflict with Palestinians marked by frequent suicide bombings and military operations. [1, 2, 3]
Political Leadership and Domestic ContextThe Prime Minister: Ariel Sharon of the right-wing Likud party took office in March 2001, replacing Ehud Barak after the collapse of the 2000 Camp David peace summit. [1, 4, 5, 6]
The Second Intifada: By September 2001, the Palestinian uprising had been raging for a year. Israel was experiencing severe security challenges, with frequent attacks on civilians in cities like Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. [2, 3]Immediate Reaction to 9/11
Official Solidarity: Prime Minister Sharon immediately condemned the attacks, declared a national day of mourning, and offered to send specialized Israeli search-and-rescue teams to New York City. [7]
Public Outpouring: On September 12, thousands of Israelis lined up to donate blood for American victims. Years later, Israel built the 9/11 Living Memorial Plaza in Jerusalem, which remains the only memorial outside the United States to list the names of all 2,977 victims. [3, 7]
Strategic Security Actions: Fearing a broader global conflict or coordinated attacks, Israel immediately increased military alerts, closed its land borders, and temporarily grounded civilian airspace. [8]Geopolitical Shifts and Diplomatic Tension
Framing Terrorism: Figures like Sharon and former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued that the attacks proved the U.S. and Israel shared a “bond of spilled blood” and faced a common extremist enemy. Over the long term, 9/11 shifted American foreign policy toward a global “War on Terror,” which ultimately aligned U.S. counterterrorism strategies closely with Israeli military tactics.
Early Diplomatic Friction: In the immediate weeks following 9/11, temporary friction arose between Washington and Jerusalem. President George W. Bush’s administration sought to build a broad international coalition against Al-Qaeda that included Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Syria. Fearing that the U.S. might make diplomatic concessions to Arab states at Israel’s expense, Sharon publicly stated that Israel would not “pay the price” to stabilize the region for Washington’s coalition. [8, 9, 10, 11]Impact on the Palestinian Authority
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat publicly deplored the 9/11 attacks and was filmed donating blood to American victims. However, scattered television broadcasts showing small groups of Palestinians celebrating the attacks in East Jerusalem and Nablus damaged global sympathy. Arafat quickly recognized that the Western perception of political violence had fundamentally changed, leading him to heavily suppress those celebrations and order armed groups to temporarily halt operations to avoid having the Palestinian movement branded as synonymous with Al-Qaeda. [2, 8][1] en.wikipedia.org
[2] npr.org
[3] facebook.com
[4] ebsco.com
[5] britannica.com
[6] gov.il
[7] en.wikipedia.org
[8] nytimes.com
[9] washingtoninstitute.org
[10] aljazeera.com
[11] theguardian.com
– Google Search google.com/search?q=Israel+a…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 12, 2026
For me, the New York City skyline was close to home. Quite literally. I grew up just across the Hudson River, with the famed skyline of America’s biggest city visible from my bedroom window. Being a Palestinian American living just outside of the world’s most famous city meant that I spent part of m