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Michael Novakhov - SharedNewsLinks℠

Ukraine Attacks Kerch Bridge Linking Russia to Occupied Crimea

Michael_Novakhov shared this story.


Destroying the structure, the only one connecting Russia to the occupied Crimean Peninsula, has long been a top objective for Kyiv.

The Kerch Strait Bridge in 2023. The structure is the only bridge linking Russia to Crimea, which Russian forces illegally annexed in 2014.Credit…Associated Press

Marc Santora and James McManagan

Marc Santora, who has covered the war in Ukraine since 2022, has written about each Ukrainian attempt to bring down the Kerch Strait Bridge.

A large section of the only bridge linking Russia to the occupied Crimean Peninsula collapsed into the sea on Tuesday after a series of Ukrainian strikes, according to photographs and video released by the Ukrainian government, and statements from officials in Kyiv.

Russian officials, who temporarily halted traffic on the structure, the Kerch Strait Bridge, acknowledged the damage and vowed to repair it.

The Ukrainian strikes were the culmination of years of attacks aimed at bringing down the bridge, a hulking symbol of Moscow’s control of Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014. The bridge is also a lifeline supplying Russian troops.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said in a statement that the attack came after months of planning. After degrading or destroying nearby air defenses, Mr. Zelensky said, Ukraine struck with missiles and drones.

While destroying the bridge has long been a top Ukrainian objective, Mr. Zelensky framed the strikes as a response to recent Russian attacks on Ukraine’s bridges and other infrastructure.

Hours before his statement, seven Russian ballistic missiles slammed into bridges over the Dnipro River in Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital. The bridges were temporarily closed, Ukrainian officials said.

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Mr. Zelensky said, “We have repeatedly offered Russia steps toward de-escalation — and every proposal has been met with loud rejection.”

“We will never leave terror against our cities and people unanswered,” he added.

Image

Workers cutting electrical wires on the Southern Bridge in Kyiv, which was damaged in an overnight strike.Credit…Evgeniy Maloletka/Associated Press

The Kremlin spokesman, Dmitri S. Peskov, noted that President Vladimir V. Putin had been briefed on the attack. “There is no doubt that the bridge will be restored and will be even better than the previous one,” he said in a statement.

The strikes on bridges hundreds of miles from the front lines were part of a long-running battle involving logistics, symbols and survival. Heavily fortified bridges are some of the hardest structures to bring down using long-range weapons.

The 12-mile Kerch Strait Bridge was opened in 2018, four years after Russia seized Crimea, and cost $3.7 billion. It has come under repeated attack by Ukraine since Moscow’s full-scale invasion in 2022, both through sabotage operations and bombardments.

With each attack, Moscow has stepped up defenses, making the bridge one of the world’s most heavily protected pieces of infrastructure.

The defensive shield includes batteries of long- and short-range air-defense systems, backed by electronic jamming equipment and smoke generators to blind incoming missiles. In the water, Russian forces have anchored rows of sunken and floating barges linked by boom barriers and nets to block drones. The authorities also installed vehicle-screening checkpoints at both entrances.

The operation to breach those defenses played out over several weeks, according to Ukraine’s domestic intelligence service, the S.B.U. Ukrainian forces hunted down radar stations and air-defense batteries across Crimea, tearing a hole in the umbrella shielding the strait, according to Ukrainian officials.

Ukraine attacked the bridge on Monday. A wave of drones struck a central arch, bending the steel ribs and leaving the support tilting under the weight of the road suspended below, officials said.

Before Russian engineers could stabilize the structure, Ukraine launched a second barrage of drones alongside its domestically built Flamingo cruise missiles, which carry warheads large enough to sever steel girders.

When those missiles slammed into the weakened span, the arch buckled completely, sending the roadway plunging into the water.

Artem Dekhtiarenko, an S.B.U. spokesman, said in a statement, “For years, the Russians have convinced the whole world that the Crimean Bridge is one of the most protected objects on the planet.”

“Today, parts of it lie on the seabed,” he added.

Footage from a Ukrainian drone shows a warhead flying toward the bridge before seemingly losing its connection. The video was first posted by a former adviser to the Ukrainian government and was later reposted by the drone’s manufacturer.

A second drone video released by the S.B.U. showed the aftermath of the attacks, with the arches and deck of the eastern side of the bridge destroyed. Social media video circulating Tuesday, verified by The New York Times, also shows a section of the eastern side destroyed, as seen from the shores of Crimea.

The Kerch bridge consists of two parallel spans — one for road traffic and another for rail — resting on long steel girders supported by reinforced concrete pillars driven into the seabed.

Near the center of the strait, both decks rise into a pair of huge steel arches that lift the roadway some 115 feet above the water so large cargo ships can pass below.

Because the span is divided into hundreds of sections, destroying one stretch does not cause a chain reaction across the rest of the bridge, making the structure difficult to knock down completely.

Image

The Kerch Strait Bridge after being hit in 2022.Credit…Associated Press

Ukraine has struck the bridge at least three times in the past.

In 2022, a truck laden with explosives detonated on the bridge, collapsing roadway spans and igniting a passing fuel train. Ukrainian forces followed up with a strike in July 2023 using naval drones that damaged the road deck. In June 2025, Ukraine conducted an underwater demolition operation involving more than a metric ton of explosives against the bridge’s submerged support pillars.

Nataliia Novosolova and Ivan Nechepurenko contributed reporting.

Marc Santora has been reporting from Ukraine since the beginning of the war with Russia. He was previously based in London as an international news editor focused on breaking news events and earlier the bureau chief for East and Central Europe, based in Warsaw. He has also reported extensively from Iraq and Africa.

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Michael Novakhov - SharedNewsLinks℠

Putin is not ready to make peace in Abu Dhabi

Michael_Novakhov shared this story from Al Jazeera – Breaking News, World News and Video from Al Jazeera.


As the Russian-Ukrainian war, which long ago entered a phase of attrition, grinds on, Russia, Ukraine and the United States began a new round of US-brokered trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, on November 10. The talks are scheduled to continue on November 11.

The talks follow a successful humanitarian operation in Oleshky, a southern Ukrainian town that has been occupied by Russian forces since 2022.

Starting in December 2025, Oleshky experienced a food crisis that worsened dramatically in the summer of this year. Over the years under Russian occupation, its population declined from 25,000 to 2,000 people, and the food crisis threatened the survival of those who remained. In the summer, however, Ukrainian and Russian intelligence services agreed to work on a local ceasefire in order to evacuate Oleshky’s inhabitants – if they wanted to leave – either to Ukraine or to Russia.

The humanitarian mission went surprisingly smoothly. Both sides stood by the ceasefire agreement, hundreds of people were successfully evacuated (mostly to Ukraine) from the long-suffering town, and it was extraordinary to see the Ukrainian and Russian human rights representatives, Dmytro Lubinets and Yana Lantratova, coordinating the humanitarian mission peacefully and with mutual respect.

Can this successful mission lay the groundwork for – or at least contribute to – progress in the Abu Dhabi peace negotiations brokered by the US between Russia and Ukraine? Several factors suggest that this is unlikely.

One immediate indicator is that the success of the mission in Oleshky was driven not by Moscow’s desire for peace but by its willingness to pander to Donald Trump’s vanity against the background of his animosity towards Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

It has long been known that Trump wanted to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. However, despite his claims that he has ended countless wars around the world, Trump is unlikely to receive this prestigious award. Today, it seems that the Trump family’s plan is to try to secure the Nobel Peace Prize for Melania Trump.

The Oleshky humanitarian mission seems to be a case in point. A few days before the ceasefire, the White House announced that it was Melania Trump – in “her formal role as Exclusive Intermediary” – who had initiated discussions on the ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine, thus dismissing not only the Vatican’s efforts to secure the Oleshky ceasefire, but also the fact that Ukrainian and Russian intelligence services had already begun discussing the temporary armistice in the summer. Moscow, however, readily backed Washington’s version of Melania Trump’s critical role in the agreement, and Kyiv had to align with that version, too.

Both Russia and Ukraine are seeking to win Donald Trump over to their side, but while both countries eventually agreed to play along with the White House’s promotion of the US first lady as a “peacemaker”, Moscow presumably considered that the success of the Oleshky humanitarian mission would benefit it more than Kyiv. Putin’s apparent reasoning here is that Moscow’s apparent willingness to cooperate may deepen Trump’s disaffection with Zelenskyy and strengthen his delusion that it is Ukraine rather than Russia that is blocking the path to the end of the war. For Putin, winning Trump over would be a way to continue the aggression against Ukraine under more favourable circumstances – not a way to come to peace with Ukraine.

Another factor suggesting that the Abu Dhabi talks are unlikely to result in progress towards lasting peace is that Moscow appointed Vladimir Medinsky, Putin’s aide, as the head of the Russian delegation for the talks in the UAE. Medinsky headed the Russian delegations for the negotiations with Ukraine in Istanbul in 2022 and 2025, and his reappointment as the delegation’s leader for Abu Dhabi suggests that the Russian position on Ukraine has not changed since the Istanbul negotiations. The only acceptable outcome of the war for Russia remains Ukraine’s surrender, and surrender was unacceptable to Ukraine in 2022 and 2025, and remains so today.

However, Putin appears to believe that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position than Ukraine, and his belief is grounded in both erroneous and realistic assumptions.

On the one hand, it is a mistake on Putin’s part to assume that the constant Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, including energy and water supplies, can undermine Ukrainians’ resilience to the point where they will demand that the authorities surrender to Russia or rebel against the government. Ukraine is fighting an existential war, in which surrender means death, torture and ethnic cleansing – practices characteristic of Russian rule in the currently occupied Ukrainian territories. Ukrainians simply have no choice other than to resist the Russian aggression.

On the other hand, Moscow is correctly assessing developments across the West, where continuing support for Ukraine is being challenged on several fronts. While European nations keep financing weapons supplies for Ukraine’s defence, a large share of the weapons the country needs comes from the US. The joint US-Israeli war against Iran depleted some US stockpiles, and US capacity to restock them is limited, which creates a significant gap in Ukraine’s offensive and defensive efforts, especially when it comes to air defence. The Democratic Party’s victory in the US midterm elections will hardly change the situation, even though the party has been more favourable to Ukraine than the Republicans: the shortage of weapons that the US can sell to Ukraine via its allies is a material rather than a political issue.

Moreover, the continued military and economic support that Ukraine receives from its European and other allies depends not only on the political consensus among those allies about the need for such support, but also on the individual positions of those allies. France will hold a presidential election in the first half of 2027, potentially followed by snap parliamentary elections, and the right-wing nationalist party National Rally has a good chance of securing both the presidency and the premiership of the French Republic. Its informal leader, Marine Le Pen, who has announced that she will stand for the presidency in the spring of next year, has already said that France can no longer provide financial assistance to Ukraine, implying that she would stop that financial aid if elected president. Despite the fact that France is the second-largest economy in the EU, it is only the fifth-largest bilateral EU donor to Ukraine; but France is an influential European country, and if it stops financial support for Ukraine, this may produce a domino effect among some other EU countries and create more economic and internal political pressure on those EU governments that continue to aid Ukraine.

Marine Le Pen, whose party received financial support from Russia in 2014 and who met Putin personally in Moscow in 2017, is most likely Russia’s best bet for 2027 with regard to weakening Ukraine’s defence. But this is not the only bet. In Germany, the right-wing nationalist party Alternative for Germany is surging in the polls, and it is the largest openly pro-Putin and pro-Trump party in the EU. And Trump himself, despite his Republican Party’s losses in the 2026 US midterm elections, remains one of Russia’s important bets in the context of the Russian war.

The fact that Russia participated in the trilateral negotiations in Abu Dhabi is not a sign that it is ready for peace with Ukraine. It is not – Russia hopes that Western support for Ukraine will wither away, and believes it has the resources to wait for that hypothetical moment.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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Michael Novakhov - SharedNewsLinks℠

Sanctioned Russian jet carrying military intel. chief lands in Israel after departing Moscow base

Michael_Novakhov shared this story.


Updated:

A Russian military transport aircraft carrying a senior delegation led by the head of Russia’s military intelligence agency landed at Ben-Gurion Airport on Sunday evening in an unusual visit, two sources familiar with the matter told The Jerusalem Post.

The delegation, which met senior Israeli defense officials, was headed by Admiral Igor Kostyukov, chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commonly known as the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency.

The purpose of the visit and the subjects discussed during the delegation’s meetings in Israel remain unclear, but the unusual landing of a Russian military aircraft in Israel comes amid heightened regional tensions and ongoing uncertainty over the possibility of renewed military confrontation between the US, Israel and Iran.

The Russian aircraft departed Israel and headed to Abu Dhabi.

The Russian delegation, including Kostyukov, will participate in the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations under US mediation scheduled for Tuesday-Wednesday.

Flightracker screenshot of flight CHD85042, November 9, 2026.Flightracker screenshot of flight CHD85042, November 9, 2026. (credit: FLIGHTRADAR24/SCREENSHOT)

The Tupolev Tu-154M is operated by the Russian Defense Ministry and departed from a military base near Moscow, flight-tracking data from FlightRadar24 showed.

The jet has been on the US sanctions list since 2023.

The Chkalovsky Air Base, from which the flight originated, is the primary operational hub for the Russian Defense Ministry, which manages VIP transport and government missions for high-ranking military officials and official delegations.

The flight path went over the Black Sea and through Turkish airspace before entering Israel from the Mediterranean. The plane circled over Israel before landing at Ben-Gurion Airport at about 7 p.m.

Flightradar24 data showed that in the past week, the aircraft has remained in Moscow since arriving from Novosibirsk on November 2.

Aircraft sanctioned by US for assisting Wagner mercenary group

The aircraft belongs to the 223rd Flight Unit of the Russian Defense Ministry, itself a sanctioned entity, as the US State Department accused the unit of transporting personnel and equipment belonging to the Wagner mercenary group to countries where Wagner operated.

The aircraft was listed under Executive Order 14024, which authorizes sanctions targeting Russia’s harmful foreign activities, including those connected to its war against Ukraine.

As part of the May 19, 2023, action, the US identified 37 aircraft associated with the unit as blocked property, including RA-85042.

When approached by The Jerusalem Post, the Russian Embassy in Israel declined to comment on who was in the aircraft or why they were in Israel.

Additionally, the IDF declined the Post’s request for comment.

The Post also reached out to several US government bodies for comment.

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Michael Novakhov - SharedNewsLinks℠

Mossad chief visits Washington as Israel presses Trump to resume Iran war: Report

Michael_Novakhov shared this story from Anadolu Ajansı Güncel Haberler.


Rabia Iclal Turan

13 November 2026•Update: 13 November 2026

The director of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency was in Washington on Friday for talks with senior Trump administration officials about the war with Iran, Axios reported, citing three sources familiar with the matter.

Roman Gofman’s visit included a meeting with CIA Director John Ratcliffe, and he is also expected to travel to Miami for talks with White House envoy Steve Witkoff, according to the report.

Mossad, the CIA and the White House declined to comment, according to the report.

The visit comes as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pressing President Donald Trump to resume the war against Iran, Axios said.

Trump said Thursday he could use military force against Iran “right now” if US allies or ships were threatened.

Asked in an interview with the Salem News Channel whether he would hesitate to use force against Iran, Trump replied: “No hesitation. We’re doing very well with it right now.”

“But the answer is, if I saw things going the other way, I would do that, and it’s possible I would do it right now,” he added.

The US and Israel launched a war against Iran on Feb. 28, prompting Tehran to retaliate with missile and drone attacks against Israel and targets in the Gulf region, where US military bases are located, and effectively close the Strait of Hormuz, a vital route for global energy supplies.

A memorandum of understanding signed in June was intended to pave the way for a final peace agreement, but the process collapsed amid disagreements, including over navigation through the strait.

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Obituary: Mohammed Atef

Michael_Novakhov shared this story from The Guardian.


Mohammed Atef, who was killed, aged 57, in an United States air raid near Kabul was, according to US intelligence, the military planner of the Islamist al-Qaida group. US Intelligence also identified him as having masterminded the bombing of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The US had placed a $5m reward on his head.

The Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir – who recently met Osama bin Laden – said that he had met Atef in 1997. In that meeting, Atef told him of his role in organising “resistance” against the US presence in Somalia in 1992. This included the downing of a US helicopter in which 18 soldiers were killed.

According to the Islamist lawyer Montasser Zayat, Atef was born in Menoufya – the birthplace of Egyptian presidents Mubarak and Sadat – in the Nile Delta, 50km north of Cairo, and he did two-years’ army national service. Interior ministry officials dismissed suggestions that Atef was a policeman, but he had no profile – and no police record – before he left Egypt in the mid-1980s to join the jihad – the holy war – against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

He was not, said Zayat, among hundreds of militants arrested by Egyptian police following the assassination of President Sadat by members of the Egyptian Jihad group in 1981. The only conviction he got in Egypt was 18 years later, when he was tried in absentia among 107 defendants accused of membership of the Jihad group, led by al-Qaida’s deputy, Ayman Zawaheri, and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. This signalled that the Egyptian authorities knew little about his role until recently.

Atef, according to the lawyer, got to know Zawaheri shortly after his arrival in Afghanistan. He was immediately sent to one of several military training camps financed by Bin Laden to fight the Russians, with the blessing of the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Zayat says it was Zawaheri who introduced Atef to Bin Laden; he became one of the Saudi’s most trusted associates.

He also developed a variety of names. Born Sobhi Abu Sitta, he was also Abu Hafs Al-Misri. Al Misri – the Arabic word for Egyptian – referred to his country of origin at a time when thousands of young mojahedeen from all over the Moslem world were flocking to join Bin Laden’s al-Qaida. Other names he used to shield his identity were El-Kabir (the big man), Taysir, Sheik Taysir Abdullah and Abu Khadijah.

After al-Qaida’s first military commander, Ali al-Rashidi – more often known as Abu Obeida Al-Bansheeri – died when his boat capsized in Lake Victoria while on a recruiting mission, Atef inherited his post. Atef was also reportedly responsible for Bin Laden’s security. He personally searched journalists who wanted to meet the Saudi dissident after the US bombed Afghanistan in 1998.

Atef, according to militants who encountered him while training in Afghanistan, was a very quiet man. In the first tape released by Bin Laden after the US bombing campaign against Afghanistan began on October 7, Zawaheri, Atef and the al-Qaida spokesman, the Kuwaiti, Suleiman Abu Geith sat next to each other. Only Atef made no speech blasting the US.

Atef strengthened his relationship with Bin Laden by following in Prophet Mohamed’s tradition. He married his daughter to one of bin Laden’s many sons, and the two sat smiling and sipping tea during their videotaped wedding released by al-Qaida early this year. In the tape, Bin Laden claimed responsibility for the first time for the suicide attack against the destroyer USS Cole, in Yemen, which killed 17 sailors.

Atef was a devout man whose hope, like all members of al-Qaida, had been to die as a martyr. The man expected to take Atef’s position is another Egyptian close to Zawaheri, Mohamed Mekawi, known as Seif El-Adl.

· Mohammed Atef (Sobhi Abu Sitta) Islamist born 1944; died November 14-15 2001

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The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Michael_Novakhov shared this story.


Abstract

The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. were undoubtedly the most brazen and shocking terrorist attacks conducted by a sub-state group in history. Al Qaeda’s capacity to achieve this outcome depended in large part on its meticulous intelligence and counterintelligence preparations. These activities allowed Al Qaeda to exert a strong measure of control over its operating environment, leading to a confidence that events would unfold as planned. Moreover, intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to form highly accurate and realistic assessments of its environment, an outcome that helps to dispel notions of an organization consumed by a level of fanaticism that distorts its perception of reality, or else frustrates its capacity to engage in rational decision making.

This article examines Al Qaeda’s use of intelligence and counterintelligence using the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001 (hereinafter, “the 9/11 attacks”) as a case study. It will trace Al Qaeda’s collection and use of operational intelligence, with particular emphasis on how this intelligence may have influenced a range of operational decisions and how it may provide evidence of Al Qaeda’s rational approach to decision making. The use of intelligence influenced critical elements of the operation, so that various key decisions were directly determined by operational intelligence accumulated over a lengthy period.

This article will analyze how those involved in the operation, including both the operatives and the leadership that directed and coordinated it, craved high levels of certainty and operational control. It will examine the idea that this search for certainty was largely satiated by the organization’s extensive use of intelligence. Aligning decisions to accommodate the conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the operation served to maximize Al Qaeda’s chance of achieving operational success.

Similarly, counterintelligence allowed for the creation of a security umbrella that shielded the operation from exposure throughout all its stages. The nature of the operation dictated the need for the hijackers to engage in behavior that exposed them to constant risk. From communications between the various levels involved in the planning and execution of the operation, to the extensive travel and preparation undertaken by the hijackers, each activity was fraught with danger. This article will critically investigate the proposition that counterintelligence allowed the hijackers to function with confidence during each of these activities, secure in the knowledge that the operation had not been compromised and that they maintained the crucial element of surprise.

This case study will, therefore, seek to examine the extent to which intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to engage in decision making based on accurate representations of reality rather than false illusions influenced by strong ideological or dogmatic perceptions of the world. Moreover, it will examine the argument that Al Qaeda’s intelligence and counterintelligence preparations for the operation may be suggestive of a rationality more sophisticated than the means–ends logic that exemplify most explanations of terrorist rationality.Footnote
1
For example, attempts to manipulate the terrorists’ operating environment for the purpose of acquiring detailed and very specific intelligence suggests a desire to base decisions on near-complete information, not just that which was immediately presented to the group. Intelligence collection on this level was intended to allow Al Qaeda to carry out operations without encountering the type of unanticipated outcomes that could lead to operational failure or blunt the impact of its political or ideological message. Just because events would demonstrate that Al Qaeda was unable to achieve an outcome as resounding as this does not diminish the rationality of its decision making or the role intelligence was expected to discharge in this process.

In this way, this study will fill a significant gap in the understanding of the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Although some effort has previously been made to examine the counterintelligence protocols of Al Qaeda during the operation,Footnote
2
no attempt has been made to assess the role of intelligence in these events. In neither case, however, has there been a serious attempt to contextualize the function of intelligence and counterintelligence as key activities within Al Qaeda’s decision-making process. Although descriptions of intelligence and counterintelligence in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks routinely stress their operational importance, analyses linking these activities to decision making and the organization’s capacity to engage in rational behavior appear non-existent.

Operational Intelligence

An analysis of the role of intelligence in the 9/11 operation demonstrates that the strength of its contribution resided in two areas, namely that of assisting in the preparation of a detailed plan, and to a lesser extent, target identification. It will be demonstrated that Al Qaeda’s preparations for the operation were designed to uncover as much detail as possible about their targets and operating environment to optimize the likelihood of operational success.

An examination of the role of intelligence in the 9/11 operation will be served best by examining two distinct phases to the operation, those of conceptualization and planning.Footnote
3
These phases clearly delineate the impact of intelligence on Al Qaeda decision making at critical junctures of the operation’s evolution, while also demonstrating the considered, deliberate, and methodical approach that characterized a decision-making process that spanned years. Revealing a clear capacity to calculate costs and benefits, frequently with the assistance of detailed intelligence, Al Qaeda during these phases displayed the hallmarks of a rational organization that engaged in reflective rather than impulsive decision making designed to achieve an act of violence of tremendous strategic and symbolic importance.Footnote
4

Conceptualization

To understand the role of intelligence in facilitating the 9/11 operation, it is first necessary to analyze its genesis as an idea. Such an examination will demonstrate that intelligence fulfilled a limited role during the earliest phases of the operation when discussion focused on the method of attack and preferred targets. It will be contended, however, that the operation’s conception at the apex of the Al Qaeda hierarchy, along with the formulation of a tentative strategy, precluded a need for the type of detailed intelligence that normally determines these fundamental questions. It will be demonstrated that by the time the Al Qaeda leadership approved the operation, the method of attack, along with at least some of the targets, had, for years, formed part of the thinking of those central to the operation. As the following discussion will show, the historical development of the 9/11 operation facilitated a refining process that transformed it from an ambitious idea into reality.

The driving force behind the 9/11 operation was Kuwaiti-born Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (hereafter “Khalid”). By the time Khalid presented his ideas to the Al Qaeda leadership for what would ultimately become the 9/11 operation (known within Al Qaeda as the “planes operation”), and prior to his membership of the organization, he had already demonstrated a keen interest in the use of aircraft for terrorist attacks. In the most well-known and ambitious of these plans, the “Bojinka” plot, Khalid and others planned to bomb twelve U.S. commercial aircraft over the Pacific during a two-day period.Footnote
5
Working with his nephew and principal plotter behind the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef, Khalid played an active role in this, his first terrorist operation.Footnote
6
This multifaceted plot also involved a plan to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his planned visit to the Philippines in January 1995. It seems to have been Yousef’s idea to use co-conspirator Abdul Hakim Murad, a trained pilot, to fly a light aircraft over the route to be taken by the Pope and drop bombs over the side.Footnote
7
At this time, Murad also contemplated flying a light aircraft loaded with chemical weapons into CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.Footnote
8
This idea emerged in casual conversation between Murad and Yousef, and no specific plan for its execution was devised.Footnote
9
At about this time, Khalid and Yousef also developed a plan to bomb U.S.-bound cargo flights by placing jackets containing nitrocellulose on board.Footnote
10
Thus, Khalid demonstrated a consistent pattern of behavior and interest, at the center of which lay the use of aircraft to attack U.S. interests. Significantly, Jack Roche informed this author that when he met Khalid for the first time in early 2000, the latter asked Roche whether the United States and Israel operated commercial aircraft out of Australia. Although this was not taken any further, Roche believes that Khalid was scouting for targets within Australia.Footnote
11

The idea of using hijacked aircraft as weapons also extended to senior members of Al Qaeda, even before Khalid put forward his proposal for the planes operation. It is believed that Mohammed Atef, at that time Al Qaeda’s operational commander, conducted a study in 1996 that concluded that traditional hijackings failed to meet the organization’s goal of inflicting mass casualties.Footnote
12
The study reportedly considered the feasibility of hijacking aircraft and blowing them up in flight.

Thus, the idea of using aircraft had some precedence within Al Qaeda, and among others on the periphery of the organization, that would ultimately perform a central role in the 9/11 operation. Furthermore, it was apparent that the use of aircraft, especially in an unconventional sense, was seen as a vulnerability to existing security arrangements. Indeed, Khalid considered the use of aircraft a more effective and less problematic form of attack compared to conventional bombing methods, a lesson he claims to have learnt from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. With this in mind, he and Yousef considered using aircraft as weapons in attacks on targets that included the World Trade Center, and, as discussed earlier, CIA headquarters.Footnote
13

Unable to realize his ambitions of carrying out an operation involving the use of aircraft on his own, Khalid was given an opportunity in mid-1996 to present his ideas to the Al Qaeda leadership.Footnote
14
During the course of this meeting, Khalid proposed an operation involving trained pilots who would crash planes into buildings in the United States.Footnote
15
Although bin Laden remained non-committal, he agreed, two years later, to support Khalid’s proposal. Over a series of meetings involving bin Laden, Khalid, and Mohammed Atef in early 1999, it was decided that the initial list of targets would include the White House, the U.S. Capitol Building, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center.Footnote
16
It is not known how detailed and involved these discussions were, and whether this list included other targets that were subsequently rejected for unknown reasons. Furthermore, it is not clear if intelligence was consulted in any comprehensive way during this initial period. It is plausible, however, that the suggested method of the attack precluded the need for intelligence at this stage because the use of aircraft as “flying bombs” exposed virtually every potential U.S. target to attack. In other words, the difficulties associated with conventional bombing methods in terms of ground security could be overcome through the use of aircraft. The Al Qaeda leadership was thus free to choose the targets it wanted, being guided almost entirely by the “statement” it wished to make through the attacks. Indeed, this appears to have been the sole consideration at this time, with the World Trade Center seen as symbolic of U.S. economic power, the Pentagon, a symbol of its military power, the U.S. Capitol as emblematic of U.S. policy on Israel, and the White House, a symbol of general U.S. political power.Footnote
17

In time, however, intelligence would reveal problems specific to this method of attack. It would appear that these problems were identified only after the hijackers engaged in reconnaissance flights. In this regard, intelligence fulfilled its intended function by identifying circumstances that could be expected to impact on the likelihood of operational success. By replicating conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the operation, the hijackers’ intelligence collection efforts were successful in identifying impediments not anticipated by the Al Qaeda leadership at the time of target selection. The indecision over whether to strike at the White House or the Capitol Building emerged only after the hijackers’ intelligence activities made it apparent that attacking the White House would be more problematic than initially anticipated. Indeed, it seems likely that Mohammed Atta was given some latitude over target selection, because the number of targets that formed the initial list (the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon, the Capitol, and the White House) exceeded the number of aircraft to be hijacked.Footnote
18
It may, therefore, be presumed that Atta was to prioritize these targets.Footnote
19
Although it is not clear on what basis they were to be prioritized, there are strong indications that intelligence played some role in this process.

From the outset of the “planes operation,” bin Laden was determined to attack the White House, emphasizing his preference on a number of occasions.Footnote
20
In May 2001, for example, bin Laden met with operations coordinator Ramzi Binalshibh, instructing him to confirm that Atta understood that bin Laden’s preference was for the White House over the Capitol. Atta, however, clearly had problems with bin Laden’s continued preference for the White House. Atta informed Binalshibh on at least two separate occasions that he considered the White House too difficult a target.Footnote
21
It is not clear why Atta considered the White House a difficult target, although Khalid’s 2002 comment to journalist Yosri Fouda that reconnaissance teams dismissed it for “navigation reasons,” may be close to the truth. According to Khalid, the small size of the White House made it difficult to see from the air, while the strong defenses surrounding the building made it a less attractive target than the Capitol.Footnote
22
Despite these difficulties, Atta informed Binalshibh that he had tasked Hazmi and Hanjour to conduct reconnaissance on the White House to evaluate the feasibility of an attack, and was apparently awaiting their answer at the time of Atta’s meeting with Binalshibh. Atta also indicated at this time that these two operatives had rented small aircraft and flown reconnaissance flights in the vicinity of the Pentagon.Footnote
23

It therefore seems clear from events that a process was in place to conduct intelligence activities designed to refine the target list with a view to maximizing the likelihood of operational success. Although it is true that the role of intelligence in this process was minor compared to operations such as that of the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya in 1998, it is nevertheless indicative of a deliberate and considered approach to decision making in which the weighing of the possibilities and likely outcomes was determined by intelligence.

It is also plausible that other intelligence was consulted in deciding on the preferred targets. Dhiren Barot and his associates were actively engaged in reconnaissance in the United States some time after the Al Qaeda leadership approved the “planes operation.” It is known that Barot entered the United States in August 2000 and again in March 2001, and that during these visits travelled to New York and Washington, D.C.Footnote
24
Barot may have scouted potential targets for the “planes operation,” in addition to those that became the subject of his casing reports. Indeed, Khalid confirmed that during the planning for the “planes operation,” he had direct contact with Barot, sending him on at least two missions during this period.Footnote
25
Other reporting also indicates possible surveillance activity in New York before 9/11 that was considered of sufficient concern that it was included in a Presidential Daily Brief in August 2001 addressing bin Laden’s intention to attack the United States.Footnote
26

Planning

By the time Khalid approached bin Laden with his idea that would become the 9/11 operation, the hijacking of aircraft was a method looking for an operation. The method of attack thus formed the essence of the operation, providing a unique mode of attack capable of circumventing existing defensive measures while also facilitating Al Qaeda’s aim of inflicting mass casualties. Intelligence during the planning phase, therefore, sought to identify vulnerabilities that would facilitate the preferred method of attack. Although the planned use of hijacked aircraft also influenced target selection by identifying vulnerabilities consistent with the method of attack (e.g., the need for buildings to be clearly visible from the air), it was during the planning phase of the operation that intelligence made its most significant contribution. Intelligence would be used to determine those details of the plan capable of facilitating the preferred method of attack in such a way as to maximize the likelihood of success. Moreover, the hijackers’ intelligence preparations were intended to achieve a high level of calculability of results by identifying security arrangements they could expect to encounter on the day of the operation. This knowledge could then be used to facilitate planning capable of negating or circumventing these security arrangements. Binalshibh would subsequently convey the thoroughness of these intelligence activities when he commented that the hijackers studied, “the security arrangements that [were] adopted at all the airports and establish[ed] a comprehensive picture about the procedures at all the airports and also unravel[ed] the security loopholes that exist at these airports … [and found] out the trips that depart and arrive at these airports … [as well as] the level of security at these airports.”Footnote
27

Within months of receiving permission to proceed with the attack, Khalid took the first steps in assembling the body of intelligence that would make the attacks possible. Relying on open source intelligence, Khalid compiled data from Western aviation magazines, telephone directories for U.S. cities, airline timetables, and conducted Internet searches on U.S. flight schools. This intelligence was supplemented by flight simulator software and information gleaned from movies depicting hijackings.Footnote
28
Some of these early intelligence efforts may have been an attempt to generate ideas and identify possible vulnerabilities. Familiarity with the enemy’s methods and culture was also deemed important at this early stage, as was the need to provide the suicide operatives the basic skills and knowledge to function in an unfamiliar and hostile environment. Khalid, therefore, organized a short course for the operatives in Karachi, which included techniques on how to conduct reconnaissance on flights. Although rudimentary in nature, these instructions proved critical in bringing the attack to fruition by encouraging the operatives to probe for vulnerabilities in the routine behavior of the flight crew. These instructions included the need to observe cabin doors during take-off and landing, whether the captain exited the cockpit during the flight, and at what stage, and using what methods, flight attendants brought food into the cockpit.Footnote
29

It was not long after that actual casing flights took place with the purpose of probing for weaknesses in airport security arrangements, and ascertaining the feasibility of elements of the plan as they stood at that point in time. One of the suicide operatives in particular, Khallad, engaged in intelligence activity with these ends in mind. For example, he flew from Bangkok to Hong Kong in early January 2000 on board a U.S. airliner, seating himself in first class. This casing flight would prove instructive because it identified problems perhaps not anticipated by the operation’s planners. For instance, Khallad was unable to view the cockpit from his seat. He also probed airport security by carrying a box cutter onto the aircraft in his toiletries bag. He subsequently removed this bag from his carry-on luggage, observing that flight staff paid no attention.Footnote
30

The hijackers conducted further intelligence activity after their arrival in the United States, again with the intention of identifying vulnerabilities capable of advancing the plan. This reconnaissance was typified by a hands-on approach designed to identify conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the attack. In this way, the plan would enjoy a greater likelihood of success because decisions would not be based on false assumptions that could mean the difference between success and failure. Realism, not distorted notions of reality determined by powerful ideological views, served to shape operational planning.

For example, it is suspected that the hijackers conducted numerous surveillance flights in an attempt to proximate as near as possible the circumstances likely to be encountered on the day of the attack. Seeking to replicate these conditions, the pilots conducted their surveillance flights while seated in first class, enabling them to monitor the cockpit and also observe firsthand the activities in first class on a transcontinental flight similar to the one that they would take on 11 September. Each also conducted their surveillance flight on the same type of aircraft he would pilot on the day of the hijackings, thereby injecting further realism into the surveillance process.Footnote
31
On the basis of the surveillance flights, Atta informed Binalshibh in July 2001 that the best time to storm the cockpit was 10 to 15 minutes after take-off when the cockpit was normally opened for the first time.Footnote
32
It is also plausible that the hijackers compared the results of their surveillance activity for the purpose of identifying behavior common to their flights, thus permitting the identification of routines susceptible to exploitation. In keeping with the hijackers’ desire to engage in activity closely replicating the conditions expected during the day of the operation, some pilots also took practice flights near some of their targets. For instance, Hani Hanjour and Nawaf al Hazmi (American Airlines Flight 77, which was flown into the Pentagon) rented a plane and traveled a route close to Washington, D.C.Footnote
33
It is significant that Jarrah and Hanjour also took separate training flights along the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude route along the Hudson River that passed by landmarks such as the World Trade Center. In fact, the Hudson Corridor would have provided the pilots an excellent view of the World Trade Center towers, and at the time was open to uncontrolled aircraft flying below 1,200 feet.Footnote
34

Atta also informed Binalshibh that he, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah carried box cutters onto their surveillance flights, encountering no problems. These surveillance flights were so successful that Atta informed Binalshibh that he would not need other weapons, and that he was so confident the cockpit doors would be opened that he did not consider contingency plans.Footnote
35
This represents an important example of the ability of intelligence to elevate terrorist confidence levels by helping to establish operational certainty.

In an attempt to explore alternate means of gaining access to the cockpit, the hijackers’ intelligence probes went beyond that of passive observation. For instance, it was reported that on 1 August 2001, Abdulaziz Alomari boarded a flight from Las Vegas to New York. Before taking off, Alomari made an attempt to secure a ride in the cockpit’s jump seat all the way to New York, on the pretext that he was on the verge of flying for Egypt Air. After being shown to the cockpit, it became apparent to the crew that Alomari was not what he claimed to be and was asked to leave the cockpit prior to take-off. During the course of the flight, he told a flight attendant that he left his pen in the cockpit and, therefore, needed to return to the flight deck. He was told that he would not be able to return to the cockpit, especially while the aircraft was in flight.Footnote
36

These highly developed intelligence collection methods were suggestive of a rationality more sophisticated than the simple means–ends logic that characterizes most explanations of terrorist rationality. Attempts to manipulate the hijackers’ operating environment for the purpose of acquiring detailed and accurate intelligence suggest a desire to attain near-perfect intelligence in which chance would play a negligible role.

To those within the law enforcement and intelligence community with even a rudimentary knowledge of Al Qaeda and the global Salafi jihad, the attacks on 9/11 could hardly have been a strategic surprise.Footnote
37
Al Qaeda’s enmity toward the United States and its desire to carry out an attack on U.S. soil was well known prior to 9/11.Footnote
38
Al Qaeda had already declared, in 1998, that it was in a state of war with the United States. Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa in which he urges jihad against Americans is unambiguous, declaring that the killing of, “… the Americans and their allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it…”Footnote
39
This was, in turn, followed by attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa (August 1998)Footnote
40
and the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen (October 2000). Furthermore, the arrest of Ahmed Ressam on the U.S.–Canadian border in December 1999 was a clear indication of Al Qaeda’s intention of bringing its war to the United States. This pattern of behavior was preceded by the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the planned attacks on prominent New York landmarks, including the Holland Tunnel, which, although not Al Qaeda inspired or organized, were certainly indicative of the dawning of a brand of Islamic militancy intent on striking directly at the United States. This strategic warning was supplemented by tactical intelligence revealing the possibility of a terrorist strike in the period leading up to 9/11.Footnote
41

Indeed, the perceived threat from Al Qaeda was such that the collection of intelligence on Al Qaeda became a high priority for U.S. intelligence and the White House in the two years leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Although arguments persist about whether the U.S. intelligence community pursued Al Qaeda with sufficient vigor in this period, it is clear that Al Qaeda was an important target whose capabilities and intentions were well known.Footnote
42
The Director of Central Intelligence at the time of the attacks, George Tenet, acknowledged this state of war, observing, “ … even before September 2001, we knew we faced a foe that is committed, resilient and has operational depth. The Intelligence Community was already at war with al-Qaida.”Footnote
43

Despite these indicators, the 9/11 hijackers were able to avoid detection, even though the first hijackers arrived in the United States 20 months before the attacks. The effectiveness of their counterintelligence tradecraft was such that Tenet informed the Joint Inquiry investigating the 9/11 attacks that, “[b]ased on what we know today, the investigation of the 9/11 attacks has revealed no major slip in the conspirators’ operational security.”Footnote
44
This statement is significant not only because it concedes that the hijackers did not reveal their intentions, but also because the subsequent investigation, even with the benefit of hindsight, was unable to detect significant lapses in the conspirators’ counterintelligence tradecraft.Footnote
45

This, of course, was not the result of luck or circumstances beyond the control of the conspirators. On the contrary, it was the result of carefully planned activity, imbued with the hijackers’ adherence to Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence tradecraft. The protection afforded by these measures allowed the hijackers to conduct their activity secure in the knowledge that their intentions, indeed, their very existence, was unknown to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community. By ensuring that their defensive measures were in place, the hijackers were free to pursue their operational objectives with confidence, and as it turned out, impunity. Counterintelligence, therefore, fulfilled a function similar to that of operational intelligence through its ability to reduce the level of perceived and actual risk and by providing the organization a significant degree of control over the direction and outcome of the operation. Ultimately, the effect of counterintelligence was to facilitate Al Qaeda’s attempts to construct and execute a specific and very deliberate act of violence by removing or minimising the uncertainties normally associated with terrorist activity.

Moreover, Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence practices demonstrated a level of practicality and an appreciation for the operational realities that defy notions of irrationality based on fanaticism or an inability to form accurate representations of reality. As noted earlier, it was realized very early that the success of the operation depended on an ability to construct a highly detailed and pragmatic understanding of the enemy and its methods. This intent and capability demonstrated a side to Al Qaeda at odds with theories based on terrorists’ distortion of reality for reasons stemming from internal pressures to conform,Footnote
46
the need for clandestiny,Footnote
47
or ideological zeal.Footnote
48
These theories suggest that many aspects of terrorist decision making can in turn be affected, including perceptions of the enemy, the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, and the capacity to calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.Footnote
49
Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence protocols in preparation for the 9/11 attacks, however, revealed a detached objectivity that allowed it to form and respond to accurate and highly detailed assessments of its operating environment. The hijackers’ effective use of cover demonstrated a capacity to suspend their strong ideological beliefs in the interests of the operational needs and realities at the time. Contrary to notions of irrationality based on a level of fanaticism that distorts reality, the hijackers’ preparedness to “abandon” their beliefs suggests a capacity to think tactically and rationally to achieve immediate and attainable ends. Indeed, this behavior tends to negate theories that terrorists’ intense ideological views, especially those with a religious orientation, inhibit their capacity to think tactically and beyond the metaphysical.Footnote
50
On the contrary, the hijackers’ preparedness to suspend these beliefs and their hostility to Western culture in the interests of maintaining a credible cover, revealed a grasp on reality, including a tactical awareness, which transcended the distorting effects of ideology.

Deception, based on a detailed knowledge of the methods and mindsets of its adversaries, was thus a key counterintelligence strategy employed by Al Qaeda in its preparations for the 9/11 attacks. In fact, this deception proved so effective precisely because it was based on the hijackers’ keen knowledge of their adversaries’ own perceptions and preconceived ideas. From the utilization of operatives likely to arouse the least suspicion, to the methods used by the hijackers to enter and operate within the United States, the effectiveness of Al Qaeda’s deception and denial stemmed directly from their plausibility. Familiarity with the West was, therefore, one of the characteristics most sought after by the Al Qaeda leadership in their selection of the pilots and cell leaders.Footnote
51
This familiarity enabled the hijackers to integrate more easily into U.S. society, thereby fulfilling the crucial requirement of remaining anonymous and indistinct. These integration efforts were aided through the hijackers’ manipulation of Western stereotypical views of Islamic militants. The adoption of Western habits, including the shaving of beards and the wearing of Western clothing, were all intended to deceive and conceal. Demonstrating an ability to adapt and suspend intense ideological views in the interests of operational reality, Binalshibh described the process involved in adopting a suitable cover:

Every brother would look at what suited him best in terms of cover, according to his age and educational standard, his physiognomy and the like, and he would consult with his brothers and exchange views with them, and the operation of adopting a security cover is in essence a process aimed at deceiving the security services generally and mystifying the people around him.Footnote
52

The strength of the security measures injected the operation with a level of resilience that stemmed from confidence in the robustness of these precautions. Without these measures, the ability to move forward would be under constant risk, so that uncertainty would overshadow every action, each telephone call made, and every trip undertaken. Binalshibh would subsequently explain that his role of co-ordinator for the operation was to solve the, “problems that might face the brothers in [the] cells and devising an appropriate security umbrella under which the brothers can move around.”Footnote
53

Almost every aspect of the 9/11 operation required confidence in the hijackers’ security arrangements. Confidence in these arrangements allowed the hijackers to engage in each of those activities fundamental to any operation, but each of which had the potential to expose the operatives and their intentions. The creation of a security umbrella during the various phases of the hijackers’ activities enabled them to move onto the next phase, reasonably secure in the knowledge that it was safe to do so. The hijackers’ method of entry into the United States serves as a useful example. The ability to function and make the necessary preparations in the United States during a period stretching over many months was dependent on them being able to enter the country without arousing the slightest suspicion. The security arrangements undertaken prior to their entry into the United States, therefore, proved crucial and formed a major part of Al Qaeda’s preparations for the operation. These measures included the selection of hijackers with little connection with Al Qaeda.Footnote
54

Similarly, the hijackers’ confidence in the integrity of their security arrangements provided the cell leaders the self-assurance to engage in extensive travel. Travel, especially that which traverses international boundaries, is a risky activity for those engaged in illicit behavior because it brings one into contact with government officials particularly alert to the possibility of unlawful activity. The hijackers, especially the pilots, however, seemed to engage in international and domestic travel at will. Atta, for example, undertook extensive international and domestic travel in preparation for the attacks.Footnote
55
The fact that all the hijackers traveled under their real names indicates the level of confidence each had in their security arrangements and the thoroughness of preparations designed to conceal their links to Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda’s security arrangements also protected the operation when, as a matter of necessity, it was required to engage in behavior more risky than that undertaken on a day to day basis. Communications between the hijackers and the Al Qaeda leadership is a conspicuous example. Due to the scale and importance of the 9/11 operation, the Al Qaeda leadership took an active role in directing it, insisting on regular progress reports, which included some of the results from the hijackers’ own surveillance activities.Footnote
56
This, of course, entailed significant risk because the lines of communication required to achieve this (between leadership, coordinator, cell leaders, and operatives) had the potential to expose almost all elements involved in the operation.Footnote
57
Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence tradecraft, however, meant that this communication could proceed confident that it would not be exposed. Indeed, Binalshibh explained that he considered communications as, “the dangerous security gap through which the enemy could infiltrate and attempt to foil any operation. Therefore, it was imperative that the network establish the most secure means of communication. …  it was imperative to have, “simplicity in the language of communication and sophistication in the method of communication.”Footnote
58

The confidence inspired by Al Qaeda’s security arrangements manifested itself in other ways, encouraging activity that might have been avoided in the absence of thorough counterintelligence measures. These measures, for example, allowed the hijackers to undertake flight training in the United States, despite the risks involved. For instance, conducting training in the United States exposed the hijackers to additional risk for a number of reasons. First, this training extended significantly the amount of time the hijackers were required to spend in the United States, all the while exposing them to the risk of detection. Second, a group of Middle Eastern males conducting flight training was more likely to attract unwanted attention in the United States than if this training was conducted elsewhere, for example some place in the Arab world or in a country less sensitive to the threat of Islamic-based terrorism. Third, conducting flight training within the target country increased the likelihood of the security services identifying the group’s intentions and methods. This became a matter for concern to bin Laden as the date for the attacks neared and anxiety levels increased. Bin Laden’s unease was such that he pressed for the attacks to occur as soon as possible, concerned by the large number of operatives in the United States at the time.Footnote
59

In reality, this training could have been undertaken almost anywhere else in the world. Binalshibh claimed that the reasons for conducting this training in the United States were financial and weather related.Footnote
60
These reasons appear insignificant, however, given the scale and importance of the planned operation. The preparedness of the Al Qaeda leadership to allow flight training to occur in the United States merely for the reasons mentioned by Binalshibh is suggestive of strong confidence in those security arrangements already in place and those that would follow.

The confidence engendered by Al Qaeda’s security measures also contributed to the operation’s resilience. The strength of these measures meant that when unanticipated problems arose, especially those that risked exposing the operation, the organizers and cell leaders felt confident enough to proceed with the plot. The robustness of the plot was such that George Tenet considered the operation’s resilience one of its defining features.Footnote
61
This was evident in a number of areas. For example, in the days leading up to the attacks, three of the hijackers received speeding tickets from local law enforcement. Remaining calm, they did not arouse any suspicion, presumably because they were sufficiently confident in the integrity of the security arrangements put into place up to that time.Footnote
62
The police officer who intercepted Ziad Jarrah later reflected that Jarrah’s demeanor did not warrant further investigation, commenting that he, “was extremely calm and cooperative throughout the entire traffic stop.”Footnote
63
In fact, some of the hijackers’ level of confidence was such that they initiated contact with law enforcement. Atta’s second-in-command, Nawaf al-Hazmi, for instance, reported an attempted street robbery to Virginia Police on 1 May 2001, just four and a half months before the attacks.Footnote
64

Aftermath

Kepel, in his study of political Islam, described the 9/11 attacks as, “ … a seismic event with incalculable consequences.”Footnote
65
This observation, and others like it,Footnote
66
captures the dramatic and far-reaching implications of the attacks. For Al Qaeda, the impact was no less dramatic. These carefully constructed and choreographed attacks, with their tremendous symbolic significance, revealed to multiple audiences Al Qaeda’s worldview centered on the existence of a struggle between the forces of good and evil. Moreover, the attacks were planned to convey the power and righteousness of Al Qaeda’s cause, while demonstrating the vulnerability of the U.S. government and all that it represents. By discrediting U.S. power in this way, Al Qaeda sought to establish the supremacy of its ideology in what it considers to be a world at war.Footnote
67
Indeed, the Al Qaeda leadership in the post-9/11 period emphasized the capacity for the mujahidin to achieve victory despite the strength of those forces massed against them. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States, despite its “great power” status, was presented as a country particularly susceptible to military defeat.Footnote
68

In fact, Al Qaeda’s successful use of intelligence and counterintelligence represented an impressive display of power in its own right. These activities, especially counterintelligence, exemplified the capacity of the organization to challenge the authority of the United States by overcoming its intelligence services, one of the most recognizable symbols of American power. By demonstrating such vulnerability, Al Qaeda further weakened perceptions of U.S. power while strengthening images of its own omnipotence and the righteousness of its cause. Moreover, this fulfilled a more practical role insofar as it provided evidence that the United States and its intelligence services could be defeated. For instance, Binalshibh, in reference to the 9/11 attacks, would comment that, “[p]eople are often morally defeated. … They have a complex towards the CIA and Mossad but why should they when Allah has instilled this nation with the duty of jihad, as we see [from the example] of these rare heroic and courageous operations?”Footnote
69
Similarly, al-Hakaymah’s Myth of Delusion observed that the 9/11 attacks, “… exposed to the world the myth of delusion called ‘NSA-CIA-FBI.’ They used to say that ‘if a mouse entered America or came out of it, you should be able to find a report about it in the archives of the American intelligence services.’ The American intelligence lost this round against al-Qaeda intelligence.”Footnote
70
In fact, presenting images of a David and Goliath struggle that can be won is central not only to Al Qaeda’s attempt to demonstrate the power of its ideology, the heroism of its operatives, and the reach of the organization, but also to inspire others who might be discouraged by the apparent omnipotence of the United States and those countries aligned with it. Presenting images of almost insurmountable odds has a solid basis in Islamic history, a fact that Al Qaeda routinely exploits to arouse and mobilize its supporters.Footnote
71

The effects of the 9/11 attacks, however, were meant to be more than just symbolic. Although emphasizing the existence of a global struggle based on a dichotomous worldview was central to Al Qaeda’s planning and objectives, the tangible and worldly goals it hoped to achieve through this symbolism were no less important. For instance, the attacks served to propel the organization onto the world stage, drawing global attention to its grievances,Footnote
72
at least some of which are rooted in reality and have political solutions.Footnote
73
Moreover, the images of power and war generated by the attacks were intended to radicalize and mobilize supporters by offering an example of a successful operation achieved through methodical planning, personal sacrifice, and submission to the will of God.Footnote
74

Conclusion

The 9/11 attacks provide strong evidence of the capacity of intelligence and counterintelligence to lead to outcomes consistent with Al Qaeda’s strategic and symbolic objectives. These critical operational tools allowed Al Qaeda to accurately evaluate its operating environment and construct plans that could lead to a carefully crafted and choreographed act of violence. These plans were firmly rooted in an understanding of the target and its milieu acquired through methodical intelligence collection. In particular, intelligence provided a level of familiarity with the target that ensured surprise or unanticipated circumstances would be kept to an absolute minimum. By attempting to replicate the conditions likely to be encountered on the day of the operation, the hijackers’ dry-runs and intelligence probes established in great detail and precision aircraft and airport security procedures and the likely reactions by airline staff to specific events, while also creating a strong sense of environmental familiarity.

The planners’ and hijackers’ predicative capabilities were, therefore, enhanced significantly by the operation’s intelligence preparations. In assembling their plans for the take-over of the aircraft, the operational leaders could construct specific responses and assign roles in anticipation that events would unfold as the intelligence indicated they would. For instance, knowledge that the cockpit doors would be opened shortly after take-off precluded the need to smuggle on board weapons other than box cutters. The need to resort to weapons more sophisticated or deadly was deemed unnecessary because access to the cockpit was unlikely to meet with the type of resistance that would require weapons other than box cutters. Furthermore, knowledge that these doors were routinely opened during the very early stages of each of the flights formed the basis of the hijackers’ intention to crash all aircraft in a coordinated, almost simultaneous series of attacks. Knowing that these doors would be opened 10 to 15 minutes into each flight provided a window of opportunity in which access could be gained to cockpits at approximately the same time. Indeed, this was considered so important that Binalshibh claimed that if the hijackers could not gain control of the cockpit during this critical period, then they would abandon their attempt to seize the aircraft.Footnote
75

Moreover, the hijackers’ extensive use of intelligence and counterintelligence lends substantial support to theories of terrorist rationality, including those that employ suicide as a tactic and strategy.Footnote
76
Despite their preparedness to die, the hijackers’ use of intelligence and counterintelligence demonstrated a desire to avoid death until the planned moment. The hijackers’ extensive use of intelligence, despite their intention to die and their intense ideological views, demonstrated a desire to maintain their grasp on reality and to be guided by the operational realities on which a successful outcome depended. This goal-oriented behavior, and the postponing of death to coincide with utility maximization, demonstrates a rationality in which suicide is employed to achieve identifiable and achievable goals. This reinforces notions that suicide terrorism is not indicative of irrationality stemming from fanaticism or an indifference to risk. Instead, the use of intelligence to maximize the benefits to be derived through suicide demonstrates deliberate and calculated behavior consistent with rational and purposive behavior.

1. See, for example, Maxwell Taylor and Ethel Quayle, Terrorist Lives (London: Brassey’s, 1994), p. 12; Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13(1) (1981), p. 385; Andrew Silke, “Beyond Horror: Terrorist Atrocity and the Search for Understanding—The Case of the Shankill Bombing,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26(1) (2003), pp. 37–60.

2. R. H. Shultz and R. M. Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al-Qai’da’s Operations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 8(2) (2004), pp. 56–79; Devin D. Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18(3) (2006), pp. 367–388.

3. George Tenet, in his testimony before the Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attack, also used these descriptors to identify the stages of the operation, along with that of execution. George J. Tenet, Unclassified Version of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet’s Testimony before the Joint Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/dci_testimony_06182002.html, 18 June 2002 (accessed 17 February 2005).

4. The notion of reflective decision making is facilitated by an ideological outlook that emphasizes the importance of patience and having a long-term view to the struggle. See, for example, bin Laden’s comments in Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 33; Abdulaziz al-Moqrin, “The Group or Crew of Execution,” Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 8 (14 April 2004). In addition to fostering a sense that operations should not be rushed, and that a methodical and deliberate approach to planning will maximize the likelihood of operational success, Al Qaeda also sees other opportunities in its lengthy struggle. For instance, The Management of Savagery, in discussing the use of aggressive counterintelligence, observes that the length of battle, “ … provides an opportunity for infiltrating the adversaries and their fellow travelers and establishing a strong security apparatus that is more supportive of the security of the movement now, and later the [Islamic] state.” Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery. The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass, available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Management_of_Savagery.pdf, n.d. (accessed 12 December 2006), p. 52.

5. Simon Reeve, The New Jackals (London: Andre Deutsch, 1999), pp. 71–93.

6. 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 147. Khalid also played a minor role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, wiring $660 to Yousef’s co-conspirator, Mohammed Salameh. Although a minor actor only in this attack, it is important because it links Khalid to the original World Trade Center bombing and is, therefore, indicative of his historic interest in this target. Terry McDermott, Josh Meyer, and Patrick J. McDonnell, “The Plots and Designs of al Qaeda’s Engineer,” Los Angeles Times, 22 December 2002.

7. Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge (New York: Regan Books, 2003), pp. 277–278; Reeve The New Jackals, p. 86.

8. Reeve, The New Jackals, p. 87.

9. Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge, pp. 277–278. It would subsequently emerge that Murad allegedly informed investigators from the Philippine National Police that he held discussions with Yousef about attacking the World Trade Center with hijacked commercial aircraft. It was alleged that the other targets would include the CIA, the Pentagon, a nuclear facility, and other U.S. landmarks. Other than the source from the Philippine National Police who provided this information to author Peter Lance post-9/11, there is no corroboration of this version of events.

10. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 147.

11. Jack Roche, interview with author, 25 August 2005.

12. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 153; Tenet, Unclassified Version of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet’s Testimony before the Joint Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks Against the United States.

13. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 153. Yousef’s interest in a second attack on the World Trade Center is supported by another source. In 1995, Murad informed FBI investigators that Yousef wished to return to the United States to bomb the World Trade Center a second time. Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge, p. 511.

14. Khalid’s approach to the Al Qaeda leadership for assistance with his ambitious plans is consistent with Burke’s thesis of the organization acting like a venture-capital firm. Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 13. Moreover, Khalid’s many meetings and discussions with the Al Qaeda leadership revealed its need for information and reasoned argument before committing its name and resources to the operation.

15. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 149. Revealing the continuity between the “Bojinka” plot and this proposal, Khalid’s original suggestion to the Al Qaeda leadership was for the hijacking of ten aircraft, nine of which would crash into targets on the U.S. east and west coasts. This idea was rejected by bin Laden as too complex. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 154.

16. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 155.

17. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Outline of 9/11 Plot. Staff Statement No. 16” (2004), p. 4.

18. Although there has been some suggestion that Zacarias Moussaoui may have formed part of a “second wave” of attacks, there is little evidence to support this position. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission formed the view that Moussaoui was being readied as a pilot for the immediate planes operation in the event that he needed to replace Jarrah. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 247.

19. Khalid reportedly informed interrogators that this list of targets was even more extensive. According to Khalid, bin Laden gave Atta a list of targets that included the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the Capitol, the White House, the Israeli embassy in Washington and the Sears Tower in Chicago. Eric Lichtblau, “Bin Laden Chose 9/11 Targets, Al Qaeda Leader Says,” New York Times, 20 March 2003.

20. 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 155, 243, and 248.

21. Ibid., pp. 244 and 288.

22. Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, Masterminds of Terror (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003), p. 127. Khalid indicated to Fouda that Al Qaeda had dispatched reconnaissance teams to the United States to scout targets for the “planes operation” during the second half of 1998, and that it was the recommendation of these teams that the White House was too difficult a target for the reasons outlined earlier. The veracity of Khalid’s claim that reconnaissance teams were dispatched to the United States to identify targets specifically in support of the planes operation as early as late 1998 is questionable. Indeed, Khalid would subsequently explain that he, bin Laden, and Atef alone decided the initial list of targets. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 155. He would also later admit that his comment to Fouda that an Al Qaeda reconnaissance committee had identified 30 potential targets in the United States during the late 1990s was a lie designed to exaggerate the perceived scale of the operation. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 492.

23. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 244.

24. United States District Court, United States of America v. Dhiren Barot, Nadeem Tarmohamad and Qaisar Shaffi. Criminal Indictment. Southern District of New York, 2005.

25. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 150. The author has viewed some of the video footage taken by Barot during these reconnaissance missions. At one stage, Barot focuses on the World Trade Center, and in an apparent attempt to simulate their destruction, tilts the camera to its side so that the buildings appear to be lying on their side. Barot can then be heard to say “boom.”

27. Cited in Joel Mowbray, “How They Did It. An ‘Evil One’ Confesses, and Boasts,” National Review 54(24) (2002), p. 37.

28. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 157.

29. Ibid., pp. 157–158.

30. Ibid., pp. 158–159. It should be noted that the intelligence activities of Khallad at this time appear to have been carried out in support of another element of the “planes operation” that was to be centered in South East Asia and also involve the hijacking of U.S. commercial aircraft. This part of the “planes operation,” however, was cancelled by bin Laden because he considered it too difficult to coordinate with the U.S. element of the plan. Despite this, it is fair to say that the results of Khallad’s reconnaissance activities were used to instruct those involved in the U.S. component of the planes operation. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Outline of the 9/11 Plot. Staff Statement No. 16 (2004), pp. 3 and 13–14. Indeed, Khallad reported on the results of his casing mission directly to bin Laden. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 159.

31. 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 242 and 248.

32. Ibid., p. 245. It is likely that these surveillance flights also yielded other intelligence crucial to the operation. For example, the hijackers would have been aware that the flights ultimately selected for hijacking would carry relatively few passengers, thus making the task of seizing control of the aircraft less risky (American Airlines Flight 77 carried 58 passengers; United Airlines Flight carried 37; United Airlines Flight carried 56; and American Airlines Flight carried 81).

33. Ibid., p. 242.

34. Russ Niles, “Senator Calls For Hudson Corridor Closure, ADIZ-Like Rules,” AVweb, available at http://www.avweb.com/newswire/10_30b/briefs/187749–1.html, 22 July 2004 (accessed 16 November 2005). Neither Jarrah nor Hanjour, however, piloted aircraft into either of the World Trade Center towers on 11 September. Although it is plausible that the pilots had not been assigned their targets at this time, whatever intelligence or lessons were gleaned as a result of these flights in all probability found their way to Atta and al Shehhi, both of whom would pilot aircraft into the towers.

35. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 245.

36. John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell. Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop it (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2002), pp. 295–296.

37. What was most certainty a surprise, however, was the method, scale, and audacity of the attacks. Indeed, it is important to note that Al Qaeda’s two other major attacks, East Africa and the U.S.S. Cole, were land- and sea-based operations, respectively. The use of an air-based attack represented a level of operational diversification intended to deceive and surprise for the purpose of maximizing utility and improving the likelihood of operational success.

38. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 233–255 and 286–288; Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), pp. 227–238.

40. The East Africa bombings served as a particularly important indicator of Al Qaeda’s new strategy, because these attacks revealed the organization’s intention of broadening its campaign to include non-Muslim lands, signalling its commitment to pursuing the “far enemy” as described in bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), pp. 47–48.

41. Perhaps the most well-known reporting on this can be found in the Presidential Daily Brief dated 6 August 2001, which not only provides a brief history on Al Qaeda’s enmity with the United States, but also makes reference to intelligence indicating possible preparations for attacks in the United States, including those involving the use of hijackings. President’s Daily Brief Dated 6 August 2001.

42. Benjamin and Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 256–325.

43. Tenet, Unclassified Version of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet’s Testimony before the Joint Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks Against the United States.

44. Ibid.

45. 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 215–216 and 229. It is true that Tenet’s remarks may have been motivated by a desire to protect himself and the U.S. intelligence community from allegations of mismanagement and incompetence. Indeed, there is some evidence of opportunities missed. These have been discussed extensively elsewhere, and do not warrant being repeated here. See, for example, 9/11 Commission Report, 254–277; Michael Elliott, “How the U.S. Missed the Clues,” Time 159(21) (27 May 2002), pp. 24–32; Seymour Hersh, “Missed Messages,” The New Yorker, 3 June 2002. Moreover, clumsiness was apparent in the hijackers’ preparations for the attacks, including those in which requests were made of flight schools to learn how to take off, but not to land. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that the hijackers were to some degree helped by the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community’s sloppy investigative work and public complacency with unusual or odd behavior. A similar observation has been made by Horgan, who commented, “[t]he sustained success of any terrorist group can often be, we must acknowledge, a reflection of poor intelligence, uninformed or un-coordinated law enforcement, and poorly directed counter-terrorism policies more broadly.” John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 24–25.

46. J. M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in W. Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 33–35.

47. Franco Ferracuti, “Ideology and repentance: Terrorism in Italy,” in W. Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 59–64.

48. Konrad Kellen, “Ideology and Rebellion: Terrorism in West Germany,” in W. Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 43; Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Orbis 29(3) (1985), p. 480.

49. Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003), p. 487.

50. Juergensmeyer, for instance, observes that, “[m]ost religious activists do not appear to think tactically. Rather than trying to deal strategically with their opponents, craft tactics, and conceive ways to discredit them, the activists see themselves as engaged in a great struggle, in which the discrediting of opponents comes naturally and even secondarily.” Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 187.

51. Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 114.

52. Cited in Mowbray, “How They Did It,” p. 37.

53. Cited in Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 119.

54. Not all hijackers conformed to this mold. Hazmi and Mihdhar, for example, were experienced militants before joining the planes operations. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 155.

55. Following his return from Afghanistan, Atta travelled to the Czech Republic from Germany by bus in June 2000. He then travelled from Prague to Newark. In early January 2001, Atta travelled to Germany where he met with Binalshibh before returning to Florida. In July 2001, Atta flew to Madrid where he again met with Binalshibh before flying back to Fort Lauderdale. Ibid., pp. 224, 227, and 244. This does not include Atta’s extensive travel within the United States.

56. As stated previously, it is known that Binalshibh and Atta met on at least two occasions (January 2001 in Germany and July 2001 in Spain). This was supplemented by other forms of electronic communication, which continued up to two days before the attacks. Ibid., p. 531. During the time Binalshibh was in contact with Atta, he was also in regular contact with bin Laden, Khalid, and other members of the Al Qaeda leadership. According to Binalshibh, communications were, “constant and continuous until a few hours before the night of the execution.” Cited in Mowbray, “How They Did It,” p. 37.

57. Al Qaeda routinely emphasizes the perils involved in communications. Al-Moqrin, for instance, has observed that, “[c]ommunications (cable, wireless, direct, indirect) are the most dangerous in killing organizations and in destroying them.” Abdulaziz al-Moqrin, “Secret Work Group,” Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 6 (17 March 2004).

58. Cited in Mowbray, “How They Did It,” p. 38.

59. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 244.

60. Mowbray, “How They Did It,” p. 37.

61. Tenet, Unclassified Version of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet’s Testimony before the Joint Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks Against the United States.

62. Robert S. Mueller, Statement for the Record FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry, available at http://www.911investigations.net/document1155.html, 25 September 2002 (accessed 5 October 2005).

63. “Hijacker Got a Speeding Ticket,” New York Times, 9 January 2002.

64. Mueller, Statement for the Record FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry.

65. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2003), p. 1.

66. See, for example, Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 11.

67. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, pp. 121–166.

68. See, for example, comments by bin Laden and Binalshibh cited, respectively, in Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Melbourne: Scribe, 2005), p. 123 and Mowbray, “How They Did It,” p. 39.

69. Cited in Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 143. This theme of providing jihadis the confidence to challenge the intelligence services continues in the post 9/11 period. For instance, one document stresses the importance of not overestimating the capabilities of the intelligence services of countries such as the United States and Israel for fear that this could discourage operations. Revealing a moderate and balanced approach to security, the document suggests that jihadis must find a middle ground that avoids both paranoia and negligence. Sheikh Abu Muhammad Asim Al-Maqdisi, Precaution, Secrecy and Concealment: Balancing Between Negligence and Paranoia, At-Tibyan Publications, available at http://www.geocities.com/rijecistine1/Makdisi—Precaution_Secrecy_and_Concealment.pdf, n.d. (accessed 15 February 2007). Similarly, al-Adl cautions that the pursuit of security should not be so extreme that operations are abandoned on the “pretext of vigilance.” Sayf Al-Adl, “The Principles of Security,” Al-Battar Training Camp no. 2 (15 January 2004).

70. Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah, The Myth of Delusion, al-Maqreze Center Site, available at http://cryptome.org/mod-usintel.pdf, n.d. (accessed 12 December 2006), p. 4.

71. Kepel, Jihad, p. 17; Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 107.

72. The activities of terrorism researchers serve to indicate the intense interest shown in Al Qaeda and its motivation following the 9/11 attacks. Despite having engaged in major operations prior to 9/11 such as the East Africa and U.S.S. Cole bombings, research relating to Al Qaeda up to the time of the New York and Washington attacks was almost non-existent. For instance, Silke observes that in the ten years before the attacks, Al Qaeda did not even appear on the top twenty list of terrorist groups that received most research attention. Andrew Silke, “An Introduction to Terrorism Research,” in A. Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 22.

73. Pape, Dying to Win; Burke, Al-Qaeda, pp. 23–25; John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 22–25.

74. Kepel, Jihad, p. 2; Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 36.

75. Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 144.

76. See, for example, Pape, Dying to Win.

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The Declassified 9/11 PDBs

Michael_Novakhov shared this story from The News And Times.


9/11 PDBs: Warning Fatigue and Sources – Gemini 


The release of the 71 declassified President’s Daily Brief (PDB) products covering 1998 through September 2001 provides an empirical look at the structural mechanics of source vulnerability and induced warning fatigue.

Rather than revealing an acute absence of awareness, the historical record demonstrates how high-volume, low-granularity intelligence creates systemic analytical paralysis.

1. Source Reliability and Deception Vectors

Across the 71 briefs, the reporting relied on an uneven patchwork of HUMINT, signals intercepts (SIGINT), and third-party liaison intelligence (e.g., Pakistani ISI, Jordanian GID, Egyptian Mukhabarat, Saudi GID). Several core vulnerabilities characterize these inputs:

  • Single-Thread and Unvetted HUMINT: Many items—such as the July 3, 1998 entry (“Reports That Bin Ladin is Planning Attacks Inside the US”) and the December 4, 1998 entry (“Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks”)—originated from uncorroborated single-source claims, walk-ins, or lower-level operatives detained abroad. Analysts repeatedly had to hedge assessments with caveat language (“reporting is unconfirmed,” “source has not been tested”).

  • Liaison Filtering and Agendas: Foreign intelligence services often channeled threat streams that served bilateral geopolitical aims—either dramatizing local extremist movements to secure U.S. security cooperation or deflecting scrutiny away from their own domestic sympathizers.

  • Adversarial Noise and Planted Chaff: Al-Qaeda leadership was aware that communication channels were monitored. Tactical chatter often deliberately exaggerated wild avenues of attack—ranging from radiological/chemical “dirty bomb” plots to operations in Europe and the Levant—pulling collection assets away from genuine operational cells operating within the United States.

2. The Dynamics of “Warning Fatigue”

The declassified collection illustrates an intelligence system caught in a chronic cycle of false alarms, which degraded executive responsiveness over a three-year span.

  1. Repetitive Top-Line Alerts Without Tactical Resolution: Between 1998 and 2001, the PDB repeatedly sounded high-level alarms:

    • Dec 11, 1998: “Significant Near-Term Threat of Bin Ladin Attacks”

    • Dec 30, 1999: “Terrorism Near-Term Threat Undiminished”

    • Summer 2001: Multiple warnings indicating that attacks were “imminent,” yet nearly all pointing vaguely toward overseas targets (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Jordan, East Africa).

  2. The “Covering Your Back” Perception: When warnings are constant but lack actionable vectors (who, where, when, how), consumers of intelligence begin to discount them as institutional hedging. Condoleezza Rice and other officials later noted that briefs like the August 6, 2001 PDB (“Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US”) read more like analytical retrospectives and generalized threat summaries than actionable, task-oriented warnings.

  3. Failure of Imagination as an Analytical Trap: Because intelligence agencies were flooded with uncorroborated leads, analysts prioritized overseas facilities (where physical defenses could be adjusted, embassies closed, and ships put to sea). Domestic hijacking warnings were evaluated through the traditional hostage/negotiation paradigm rather than as suicide mass-casualty projectiles.

The Analytical Takeaway

The declassified PDB archive demonstrates that over-warning without specificity is functionally equivalent to no warning at all. When intelligence products continually sound sirens using disparate, questionable raw source material, senior leadership develops an operational numbness—making it nearly impossible to isolate the genuine signal from the deafening background noise.


Analyzing 9/11 PDBs
Persistent but useless warnings about the Al Qaeda in intelligence reports, including from Russia, Germany, and Israel as the cover: questionable sources, skillful placements – GS:
U.S. intelligence files declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) confirm that the United States received a high volume of vague, non-specific threat alerts from multiple global entities prior to September 11, 2001. These documents—including President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) spanning from 1998 through September 2001—show that while foreign services like those of Russia, Germany, and Israel frequently flagged Al Qaeda intentions, the raw intelligence often suffered from “warning fatigue,” questionable sources, and a lack of specific, actionable data. [1, 2, 3]
The systemic breakdown described as “questionable sources and skillful placements” manifests across the intelligence chain in several distinct ways.




On September 11, 2026—the 25th anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks—the CIA declassified 71 President’s Daily Brief (PDB) products related to al-Qa’ida and Osama bin Laden.

Analyzing 9/11 PDBs and Deception Hypotheses – Gemini 



The intelligence documents reveal that by late 1999, the frequency of conflicting threat targets was so high that senior officials—including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—questioned whether Al-Qaeda was intentionally feeding the U.S. false information to force them into wasting resources.

My opinion:

AI Overview

U.S. intelligence files declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) confirm that the United States received a high volume of vague, non-specific threat alerts from multiple global entities prior to September 11, 2001. These documents—including President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) spanning from 1998 through September 2001—show that while foreign services like those of Russia, Germany, and Israel frequently flagged Al Qaeda intentions, the raw intelligence often suffered from “warning fatigue,” questionable sources, and a lack of specific, actionable data. [1, 2, 3]
The systemic breakdown described as “questionable sources and skillful placements” manifests across the intelligence chain in several distinct ways:




PERSISTENT WARNINGS AS THE COVER

“Fourty warnings in three years” is on average one warning monthly. Nice job of Cover building.
The info was coming from Russia, Germany, and Israel. among the others. Is it not interesting?

“Title and Intent: Titled “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US,” the brief was compiled by the CIA at the request of President Bush, who had specifically asked if any intelligence pointed to a domestic threat.”
– Who helped him to formulate this question? The one who knew the answer?
Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs), intelligence warnings
Analyzing 9/11 PDBs and Deception Hypotheses – GS
AI Mode
The relationship between Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs), intelligence warnings, and the subsequent “deception hypotheses” surrounding the September 11 attacks centers on what the U.S. government knew prior to 9/11 and how agencies responded afterward.
For decades, the historical debate was shaped by a high-volume “signal-to-noise” problem. However, newly declassified materials have provided more granular insights into how information flowed to the highest levels of government. [1, 2]



–




My impression: It looks like the paper and/or cyber trail were carefully and skillfully constructed as the part of the Cover in preparation for the 9/11 attacks. This is not the style of the non-state actors, such as “Al Qaeda”.

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Here’s what the CIA kept secret for 25 years since the 9/11 attacks

Michael_Novakhov shared this story from MS NOW.


On Friday — 25 years after the Sept. 11 attacks — the CIA released a trove of presidential daily briefings leading up to that day, providing a stark chronological timeline of flashing warning signs missed by multiple administrations.

The CIA said the collection is the agency’s single largest release of declassified President’s Daily Brief products related to 9/11, “providing unprecedented transparency on America’s most sensitive intelligence publication from the years before and the day after one of the darkest moments in our history.”

“The products trace the story of CIA analysts’ evolving understanding of al-Qa’ida and efforts to highlight and warn of Usama Bin Ladin’s attack plotting despite sparse, vague, and imperfect information,” the CIA said in its release.

While much of the information had been revealed in the last 25 years, including through the 9/11 Commission Report, most of the documents themselves have not been seen by the American public. The documents reveal the consistent drumbeat of intelligence presented to then-Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush about the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida.

Most striking is a PDB from Dec. 4, 1998, detailing a suspected hijacking plot. Previously reported on by The Washington Post in 2004, the memo — starkly titled “Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks” — wrote in plain language, “Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US, including an aircraft hijacking.”

The memo indicates sources said that “two members of the operational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport” and noted “some members of the Bin Ladin network have received hijack training,” raising questions as to why airport security was not increased in the subsequent years leading up to 9/11.

A U.S. official told MS NOW that CIA analysts at the time struggled to obtain information about al-Qaida and fully analyze it.

“It was a small team, a few dozen people,” the official said. “Counterterrorism was not a priority.”

The official said leading up to 9/11, Bin Laden was not a top focus in terms of intelligence collection.

“[Bin Laden] was not a priority collection target,” the official said, adding that information on the terrorist leader was “extremely sparse.”

But throughout the 71 documents starting on Feb. 13, 1998, CIA intelligence paints a clear picture of a Bin Laden determined to attack the United States — while being unable to pinpoint specifics.

The briefs repeatedly detail Bin Laden’s efforts to “procure unspecified chemical, biological, and nuclear substances” and his dependence on Taliban’s “goodwill” to provide safe harbor for him and his associates to conduct terrorist plots in Afghanistan.

As of June 1998, the U.S. had no information indicating Bin Laden had a terrorist cell in the U.S., with a September 1998 memo describing Bin Laden’s nongovernmental organization-funded network in the U.S. as “loosely connected.”

A July 3, 1998, memo detailing four reports from “highly questionable sources” suggests Bin Laden planned to conduct an attack in the U.S., including one in Washington “probably at a shopping mall.”

“We have little information on Bin Ladin’s operatives in the US,” it said.

Still, in September 1998 the U.S. maintained that the “most serious threat” of terrorism came from Bin Laden and affiliated groups despite his U.S. associates seeming “less structured than cells in other countries,” with Europe viewed more at risk.

“Intelligence provides no conclusive information on Bin Ladin’s intentions for future attacks,” a Sept. 10, 1998, memo says.

“Bin Ladin late last month said his preferred option is to strike the US on its own soil in Washington,” the memo warns. “The same group responsible for the bombings in Africa may fly an explosive-packed airplane into a US city.”

A Dec. 11, 1998, memo built on the PDB a week earlier warns of an aircraft hijacking (see above) — “over the past two months suggest Bin Ladin’s group is preparing one or more terrorist attacks in the near future” … “several reports of impending anti-US terrorist operations” … “planning to hijack aircraft before Ramadan.”

By May 25, 1999, the daily brief reports that Bin Laden “is pursuing a variety of options for developing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities” and includes a stark warning: “Scientists are developing a “nuclear weapon” at a facility in Heart, and Bin Ladin believes it could be ready in one to two months.”

Through the fall and winter of 1999 — two years before the 9/11 attack — intelligence memos consistently reported Bin Laden’s determination to target and attack the U.S., with an Aug. 3, 1999, memo noting, “The ongoing activity of Bin Ladin operatives reflects the resilience of his organization in the face of setbacks … his personnel still are planning attacks in widely scattered locations such as Washington.”

“The extent of Bin Ladin’s reach and the variety of targets make anticipating attacks difficult,” the report says. A manifesto seized in March 2000 recommended attacking “population targets, such as skyscrapers, airports, or nuclear power plants.”

The documents reveal an intelligence community struggling to “pinpoint targets of timing” for a possible Bin Laden-ordered attack, but still, the memos do not indicate an urgency to track down the al-Qaida leader nor meaningfully increase pressure on the Taliban to surrender him.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Clinton vigorously defended his administration’s counterterrorism record, saying his team broke up al-Qaida cells, prevented several terrorist incidents and tried numerous times to get Bin Laden. Clinton told the 9/11 commission that if the U.S. had actionable intelligence about where Bin Laden was, he would have mobilized special operations forces to take action.

“Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qua’ida and sympathetic groups are determined to carry out spectacular terrorist attacks against the US before yearend,” a December 2000 briefing warns.

But the alarms persisted long after Clinton left office.

Several memos prepared for Bush throughout early 2001 caution against the threat of Bin Laden’s “extensive program to develop or acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and materials,” as well as his desire to drive U.S. forces from the gulf and willingness to “try unconventional attacks to advance this goal.” One memo says Bin Laden designing or testing a nuclear device was the “least probable scenario,” with another noting, “Bin Ladin and his associates have experimented by crude means to make and deploy biological agents.”

Over the course of the spring and summer of 2001, threats became more specific — and prescient.

A May 22, 2001, memo says “planning is under way for three separate operations in [REDACTED] to take US diplomats or civilians hostage,” warning conspirators seeking release of U.S.-held prisoners “may hijack an aircraft or storm a US Embassy.”

“For the second time in two weeks [REDACTED] indicates that an expected imminent Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operation has been postponed, but preparations for other near-term attacks may still be in train,” a July 24, 2001 report says, adding, “Something they had expected to hear in the news is still planned but has been delayed a few months.”

A month before 9/11, the intelligence community warned of al-Qaida’s ability to attack within U.S. borders

“Al-Qa’ida members-including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks,” an Aug. 6, 2001, memo says, noting that while the U.S. had not been able to corroborate “some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft,” FBI information since then still “indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.”

Bush told the 9/11 commission that that memo — the 36th item that year related to Bin Laden or al-Qaida and the first specifically devoted to the possibility of an attack within the U.S. — was “historical in nature,” but did not recall discussing it with the attorney general or whether his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, had done so.

“[Bush] said that if his advisers had told him there was a cell in the United States, they would have moved to take care of it,” the 9/11 Commission Report says. “That never happened. “

Speaking at a memorial ceremony at the Pentagon 25 years later, Rice gave a “deeply personal” apology to the families of the nearly three thousand people who lost their lives.

“Those of us in authority on that day did not see the nature of the danger in time to prevent the attack of 9/11,” she said. “We did what we knew to do, but by definition, it was not enough.”

She called it a “miracle” that there was not a follow-up attack, expressing gratitude for the armed forces and intelligence community.

“Their service and their sacrifice in the war on terror kept us safe,” Rice said. “But I will always carry deep personal remorse for the pain that you, the families of the fallen, still feel, and for the trauma that our country endured.”

Nora McKee, Peggy Helman, Kevin Frey and David Rohde contributed to this report.

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Mossad and 9/11

Michael_Novakhov shared this story from The History Reader.


By Gordon Thomas

Anti-Semitic conspiracists plan to flood the internet to mark the tenth anniversary of 9/11 attacks by resurrecting the old canard that Mossad, Israel’s secret intelligence service, knew in advance of the attack – and did not warn the CIA and FBI.

The conspiracists say that the attack on the Twin Towers was a “false flag” operation organised by Mossad as part of an ongoing attempt by Israel to launch a war against its Muslim “enemies”.

The fact is that Mossad warned that an attack was impending.

From the day bin Laden’s suicide bombers partly destroyed the World Trade Center in 1993, Mossad had placed him at the top of its own list of most wanted terrorists. Its deep-cover field agents had picked up “whispers in the wind” that bin Laden was planning “something big,” said one report. Another spoke of a “strong rumour bin Laden is planning a Hiroshima type attack.” Still another revealed a flight simulator being used in an al-Qaeda training camp near Kabul. Then came the news that bin Laden had been trying to obtain chemical and nuclear weapons.

While Mossad analysts tried to connect the dots, the reports were also passed on through the long-established back channel to the CIA. The Pentagon was asked to evaluate the threat of an air strike. One of its analysts, Marvin Cetron, wrote, “Coming down the Potomac, you could make a left turn at the Washington Monument and take out the White House.” Another analyst, Martin Clefran, was told “look we can’t manage a crisis until it is a crisis”.

Before 9/11, there was a feeling in Washington that Mossad was once more crying wolf, that it had a vested interest in promoting Islamic fundamentalism as a threat because it feared its terrorists and wanted to persuade the United States that it also faced a similar threat. By the time Efraim Halevy, head of Mossad before 9/11, had come into office, dutifully read the files on terrorism threats, and seen the reaction to Mossad’s warnings, he had decided that, in the words of one of his senior officers, “there was no point in pushing against a bolted door.”

However, Haleavy confirmed to me that Mossad “had sent several warnings in the week prior to September that an attack was coming” and cited “credible chatter” Mossad agents had picked up in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. In his diplomatic way, he implied that the growing turf war between the FBI and CIA in 2001 was one reason why the warnings were ignored Both agencies had concrete evidence that al-Qaeda was an increasing threat: one of its operatives had been stopped at the last moment from flying a hijacked plane into the Eiffel Tower in Paris, and intel had emerged at Langley, indicating bin Laden was planning an air strike against the economic summit it Italy earlier in 2001. But the sense of paralysis and denial, compounded by the growing turf war between the FBI and the CIA, had continued to hold the U.S. intelligence community in its grip

After 9/11 Haleavy recalled the “hot line from Langley was superheated”. A dozen calls a day from George Tenet, then the CIA chief.

In one call Haleavy had snapped: “Where was your electronic surveillance?” to Tenet, who was facing intense criticism himself and wanted to know how much Mossad had known about the impending attack.

As conspiricists continue to spin their lies, the reality is that Mossad tried to warn the United States. As some choose to attack past events, those in the intelligence world need to continue to improve contact and sharing of vital information.


GORDON THOMAS is a bestselling author of dozens of books published worldwide, including many on the international intelligence community, such as Secret Wars. His awards include the Citizens Commission for Human Rights Lifetime Achievement Award for Investigative Journalism, the Mark Twain Society Award for Reporting Excellence, and an Edgar Allan Poe Award for Investigation. You can visit him online at www.gordonthomas-author.com.

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Michael Novakhov - SharedNewsLinks℠

2 ex-FBI officials charged with lying about involvement in investigation into Hunter Biden’s laptop

Michael_Novakhov shared this story.


WASHINGTON (AP) — Two former FBI officials were charged Friday with lying to Congress about their involvement in investigating Hunter Biden’s laptop in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election, the latest in a series of splashy and politically charged actions the Justice Department has undertaken ahead of next month’s midterm contests.

Nikki Floris and Bradley Benavides, former leaders of a since-disbanded task force set up to counter foreign election interference, appeared in federal court in Washington, where their lawyers pressed for a speedy hearing to contest allegations their clients lied to lawmakers by saying that they did not participate in FBI investigations of Biden.

The prosecution, a rare Department of Justice criminal case against a former employee, revisits a tangled and peculiar saga that roiled the final weeks of the 2020 race. It also comes amid a broader, backward-looking effort by FBI Director Kash Patel, who before taking over the nation’s premier law enforcement agency was a harsh critic of it, to scrutinize high-profile episodes from the bureau’s recent past that for years have animated President Donald Trump’s conservative base.

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Floris’ attorneys called her “a patriot” and said she has “served our nation as a dedicated FBI intelligence officer for nearly 20 years.”

Two ex-FBI officials who specialized in foreign election interference have been charged with making false statements about Hunter Biden’s laptop. The AP’s Marcela Sanchez has more.

“Yet today, the DOJ has accused her falsely of a crime on the say-so of politicians, not on the facts,” her attorneys said in a statement. “It’s no coincidence the government is filing these nonsense charges now, years later, on the eve of an election.”

Attorneys for Benavides accused the government of bringing “baseless criminal charges against him in a transparently political complaint.”

“This is another sad day for the Department of Justice,” his lawyers said in an emailed statement. “But now we are in court, and the truth will come out: Brad Benavides is a true patriot who devoted his career to protecting this country and its people. These charges are a disgrace.”

A criminal complaint comes just before the midterms

The case was filed less than two weeks before the Nov. 3 elections via criminal complaint, which means prosecutors have not yet presented the allegations to a grand jury for an indictment. The Justice Department has repeatedly struggled in high-profile cases to convince grand juries in the nation’s capital to return indictments.

During the former FBI employees’ court appearance, both defense attorneys and the judge noted the unusual move to charge the case through a complaint, which is more often used by prosecutors when they have an urgent need to take people into custody because, for example, they present a danger or a risk of flight.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Zia Faruqui remarked that it is “rare that we have charges this old coming in this nature,” and over the objections of prosecutors who pushed for more time, set a preliminary hearing for next Tuesday, citing what he said was the “sword of Damocles” hanging over the defendants’ heads.

The laptop discovery created turmoil in 2020 election

The revelation of the laptop’s existence in October 2020 injected a thorny storyline in the race between Trump, the Republican incumbent, and Biden’s father, Joe Biden, Trump’s Democratic challenger who went on to win the race.

The laptop was publicized by the New York Post, which said it had obtained from Trump ally Rudy Giuliani a hard drive of a computer dropped off by Hunter Biden at a Wilmington, Delaware, repair shop about a year earlier.

The criminal complaint aims to build on longstanding congressional Republican complaints about the FBI’s handling of the laptop, including allegations that the bureau was not forthcoming to the public that the materials on it — including emails that showed discussions of the younger Biden’s foreign business dealings — were authentic and not the product of Russian disinformation.

The curious circumstances of the laptop’s discovery raised concerns among Democrats and former intelligence officials about the possibility of Russian involvement, particularly at a time when the Trump administration’s own intelligence community had assessed that Moscow that Russia was attempting to interfere in Trump’s favor in the election and as Giuliani had traveled abroad looking for dirt on the Bidens. Dozens of former U.S. intelligence officials signed a letter saying that the laptop bore the “classic earmarks of an Russian information operation.”

But Trump’s then-director of national intelligence, John Ratcliffe, said in a letter to Congress that there was no proof foreign actors had anything to do with the laptop. The FBI under then-Director Chris Wray subsequently endorsed that position.

Hunter Biden was charged with, and convicted of, gun and tax offenses during his father’s administration. Joe Biden pardoned him in his final weeks in office.

The case shines a light on an FBI task force on foreign intelligence

The complaint alleges that in their capacity as leaders of the Foreign Influence Task Force, Floris and Benavides were deeply engaged in the investigations into Hunter Biden, and that Biden was a recurring subject at FITF meetings.

Yet, the complaint says, both downplayed their firsthand knowledge of the laptop or involvement in investigations during 2023 testimony to lawmakers who were doing their own Biden investigation.

It accuses Benavides of making a false statement by saying he learned through Wikipedia that the FBI was in possession of the laptop, and says Floris falsely claimed to have had no knowledge of Hunter Biden having been the subject of discussions at FITF.

“Lying to Congress by senior FBI officials strikes at the heart of our system. No one is above the law,” Patel said.

The case brings renewed attention to the work of the task force, which was established in the first Trump administration to police influence campaigns staged by Russia and other nations aimed at sowing discord, undermining democracy and spreading disinformation. The task force became a magnet of congressional Republican criticism in part because of the Hunter Biden investigation and was disbanded in February 2025 by then-Attorney General Pam Bondi.

The Justice Department has made other splashy moves

As FBI director, Patel has presided over widespread firings of agents who were involved in investigations of Trump or who are perceived as being against the Republican administration’s agenda.

He has also focused attention on years-old investigations like the Hunter Biden one that occurred before he became director and that have been the subject of grievances and complaints by Trump allies.

The Justice Department historically looks to avoid public and overt investigative acts in the direct lead-up to an election that involve candidates or that risk influencing a political outcome. But officials in the last two weeks have made a series of bold moves in cases with political undertones, including a search of Democratic Rep. Ilhan Omar’s house in an immigration fraud investigation and a corruption indictment unsealed Thursday against powerful Democratic Virginia state Sen. L. Louise Lucas.

Omar and Lucas are both Trump critics. Omar, who’s from Minnesota, has called the search of her Washington home an “attempt to target political enemies and weaponize federal law enforcement.” Lucas has said she won’t be intimidated or bullied by the federal government in its case against her and “will not back down.”