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Tweets - Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) / Twitter

RT by @mikenov: RT by @mikenov: Russia’s strategic goals remain exactly the same as they were in February 2022, but the current situation on the ground will never allow the Kremlin to reach them. Because staying the course means losing the war, Putin will

Russia’s strategic goals remain exactly the same as they were in February 2022, but the current situation on the ground will never allow the Kremlin to reach them.

Because staying the course means losing the war, Putin will be forced to find a way to escalate, raising a critical question:

What options does Russia actually have left to escalate?

Russia is all in on its war against Ukraine but continues to fail. Putin will likely be forced to keep escalating, as his current efforts are causing Russia to lose the war. The core issue is that the Kremlin does not have many remaining paths, and every single one comes with massive downsides. If he could easily escalate, he would have done it already.

His first main option is simply to do more of what he is already doing. This means ramping up strikes against civilians, cultural monuments, and hospitals in Ukraine, while increasing the number of sabotage operations across EU territories. This approach would likely be accompanied by more useless Oreshnik strikes and empty nuclear threats.

While he can try to increase these efforts, it will not solve his issues on the ground. Russia has vast but ultimately limited resources, and wasting even more of them on civilians will not help his army on the front lines.

The second option is to launch another wave of mobilization. This would provide more men to attack and defend on the front, alongside more personnel for air defense inside Russia. It could allow Russia to launch a new offensive in Ukraine’s north or even the west, stretching Ukrainian troops to help operations in the east.

However, mobilization is incredibly expensive. It would ruin Russia’s economy and demographics even further, leading to massive inflation and a severe lack of labor. It is also an unpopular measure. Despite the risks, it is not too unlikely. Russia currently manages to recruit enough volunteers to maintain the status quo, but not enough to actually increase the overall size of its armed forces.

The third and final main option is to go beyond conventional warfare by using tactical nuclear or chemical weapons. This would be a massive international crime, and there are very good reasons why Russia has not taken this step yet. For one, it does not actually solve Russia’s practical issues on the front lines.

Furthermore, Russia’s allies and enemies are both firmly against the idea. Even China, Russia’s biggest enabler, does not want it. The West would likely retaliate far more aggressively than it currently does, and even Donald Trump would not support it. While the Kremlin loves to keep this option open to threaten the world, it remains highly unlikely to happen.

Ultimately, if Russia still wants to achieve its strategic goals, it has almost run out of moves. Mobilization stands as his best remaining option, but even that path is highly risky and does not guarantee the desired outcome for Russia