#Ukraine #Russia #FBI Policies and practices of personal retaliations worldwide by intelligence services of Ukraine Since the escalation of the full-scale conflict with Russia, the operations of Ukraine’s primary intelligence agencies—the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) (focused on domestic counter-intelligence and sabotage) and the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) (military intelligence)—have evolved significantly. [1] Public reporting, statements by Ukrainian officials, and analyses from international security experts indicate that Ukraine’s approach to targeted operations and retaliations follows specific patterns: 1. Official Stances and Ambiguity Strategic Ambiguity: As a matter

#Ukraine  #Russia  #FBI
Policies and practices of personal retaliations worldwide by intelligence services of Ukraine

Since the escalation of the full-scale conflict with Russia, the operations of Ukraine’s primary intelligence agencies—the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) (focused on domestic counter-intelligence and sabotage) and the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) (military intelligence)—have evolved significantly. [1]
Public reporting, statements by Ukrainian officials, and analyses from international security experts indicate that Ukraine’s approach to targeted operations and retaliations follows specific patterns:
1. Official Stances and Ambiguity

Strategic Ambiguity: As a matter of official policy, the Ukrainian government and its intelligence agencies rarely claim direct, official responsibility for specific assassinations or sabotage operations inside Russia or deep behind enemy lines. Instead, they typically employ a policy of plausible deniability or make suggestive, veiled comments attributing the incidents to “karma,” internal Russian dissent, or domestic collaborators.
Retaliation Narrative: In public rhetoric, Ukrainian intelligence leadership (such as HUR chief Kyrylo Budanov) has stated that those who commit war crimes against Ukraine or act as high-level traitors will face justice, implying that covert actions are viewed as legitimate wartime operations against military targets and enemy combatants.

2. Typology of Targeted Operations
Independent monitors, such as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), and major investigative outlets report that Ukrainian intelligence operations generally target specific categories of individuals:

Occupation Officials and Collaborators: In Russian-occupied territories, middle- and high-ranking local administrators, Moscow-appointed politicians, and local collaborators have frequently been targeted using car bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and targeted shootings.
Military and Intelligence Officers: High-profile Russian military commanders, propagandists, and intelligence officers deep within Russian territory have been assassinated. Notable reported cases include the car bombing of propagandist Darya Dugina, the shooting of former submarine commander Stanislav Rzhitsky, and the bombing that killed military blogger Vladlen Tatarsky.
Defectors and Traitors: Individuals who actively betray Ukrainian military secrets or switch sides to aid Russian forces face targeted intelligence operations. [3]

3. Geographical Reach and Methods

Behind Enemy Lines and Inside Russia: While operations began primarily in occupied areas like the Donbas and Crimea, they rapidly expanded into the Russian mainland, including Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Proxy and Partisan Networks: Many operations are not carried out directly by active-duty Ukrainian officers crossing borders. Instead, the SBU and HUR recruit, fund, and coordinate local proxy networks, anti-Kremlin Russian partisan groups (like the Russian Volunteer Corps or the Freedom of Russia Legion), or localized resistance movements operating inside Russia and occupied zones.
International Remit: While most operations take place within Ukraine and Russia, some intelligence activity has extended globally. For example, Ukrainian special forces and HUR operatives have reportedly engaged in operations against Russian Wagner Group mercenaries and assets in parts of Africa (such as Sudan and Mali) to disrupt Russian state influence and revenue streams globally.

4. International Legal and Diplomatic Friction

Western Partner Constraints: Intelligence relationships with Western backers, particularly the U.S. CIA, have historically been structured around intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism, and defensive strategies. Major Western allies have frequently expressed discomfort with extrajudicial targeted killings inside sovereign Russian territory, fearing escalatory risks or violations of international legal norms. As a result, Ukraine generally executes these targeted retaliatory campaigns independently of foreign intelligence oversight.
Legal Debate: International legal analysts note that while targeting active military commanders fits within the framework of taking out enemy combatants during an armed conflict, extrajudicial execution of civilian administrators or media figures raises complex legal questions regarding due process and the boundaries of international humanitarian law. [3, 5]

AI responses may include mistakes.

[1]  aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/3/…
[2]  facebook.com/dailytaskeenoff…
[3]  acleddata.com/report/persona…
[4]  youtube.com/watch?v=bpCUPwVl…
[5]  lieber.westpoint.edu/retalia…
[6]  forbes.com/sites/davidkirich…
[7]  abcnews.com/International/ci…
[8]  nytimes.com/2024/02/25/world…

Ukrainian intelligence services have increasingly utilized targeted killings, sabotage, and covert retaliatory operations as an extension of their wartime strategy. While Ukraine’s official military policies emphasize alignment with international humanitarian law regarding conventional warfare, its primary intelligence bodies operate a highly active, unacknowledged campaign targeting individuals perceived as traitors, high-ranking Russian commanders, or high-profile collaborators. [1, 2, 3]
Key Agencies and Leadership Stance
The two primary agencies executing these operations are the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) (internal security and counter-intelligence) and the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) (military intelligence). [1, 4]

The Doctrine of Retribution: High-ranking Ukrainian officials have frequently contextualized these operations as acts of necessary wartime justice. Vasyl Malyuk, the head of the SBU, famously affirmed this stance by stating, “Every crime of the aggressor must be punished.” Internally, intelligence officials have occasionally drawn public comparisons to historical precedents like Israel’s Mossad, indicating a long-term commitment to pursuing individuals who violate Ukrainian sovereignty. [1]

Scope and Geographic Practice
The practice of personal retaliation has expanded across multiple distinct geographic tiers since the 2022 full-scale invasion: [2]

Occupied Territories of Ukraine: This is the most active zone of assassination operations. Targets are heavily focused on Russian-appointed middle-ranking occupation officials, local collaborators, and military figures. The methods frequently involve improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, and localized ambushes. [2]
Inside the Russian Federation: Ukrainian intelligence has repeatedly managed to strike high-profile targets deep within Russian territory. Notable operations include the assassination of Russian military commanders—such as Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, the head of Russia’s nuclear, biological, and chemical defense forces, who was killed in Moscow by a recruited operative using a bomb concealed on an electric scooter. [2]
Global Operations: HUR has expanded its operational footprint internationally to counter Russian influence and personnel abroad. This has included documented deployments of Ukrainian special forces and intelligence elements to conflict zones like Sudan and parts of the Sahel region to target Russian Wagner Group mercenaries.

Operational Methodology
Rather than relying entirely on deployed Ukrainian agents, intelligence services often exploit local proxies or recruit disenfranchised individuals to limit direct exposure. For operations deep within Russian territory, Ukrainian handlers frequently recruit third-party foreign nationals or locals via digital channels, offering substantial financial payouts and promises of extraction or EU relocation upon successful completion of the hit. [2]
While these practices remain highly effective as psychological warfare and strategic deterrence, international observers and human rights organizations note that extrajudicial executions raise long-term concerns regarding international law, due process, and a cycle of violence that could outlast the conventional war. [2]

[1]  cepa.org
[2]  acleddata.com
[3]  lieber.westpoint.edu
[4]  english.nv.ua

– Google Search  google.com/search?q=Policies…

Pic.:  forbes.com/sites/davidkirich…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026