Hanning and Patrushev – Google Search google.com/search?q=Hanning+…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 17, 2026
Author: wawiimuy
June 20, 1942. A car pulls up to the main gate of Auschwitz.
Inside are four men in SS uniforms. The guard doesn’t raise the barrier fast enough, so the officer in the passenger seat leans out and screams at him in German to open the damn gate.
The guard snaps to attention and lets them through.
None of them were SS. All four were prisoners. And they had just stolen the car right out of the camp.
The man who yelled at the guard was Kazimierz Piechowski, prisoner number 918. He had been in Auschwitz for two years, since the camp’s very first months, when it held mostly Polish political prisoners. He was 22.
His friend Eugeniusz Bendera, a mechanic working in the camp garage, came to him with news. His name was on a list to be executed. He wanted out. He knew where the SS kept their cars. And he could drive.
Piechowski knew something too. Because of his work assignment, he knew there was a storeroom full of SS uniforms and weapons.
So they planned the impossible.
They recruited two more men, a Polish army officer named Stanisław Jaster and a priest named Józef Lempart. On a quiet Saturday, when fewer guards were around, the four of them pushed a cart full of trash out through the camp gate. The one with the words Arbeit Macht Frei over it. To the guards, they looked like just another work detail.
Once outside the inner fence, they slipped into the building with the storeroom. Piechowski climbed in through a coal chute, unlocked the door, and they grabbed SS uniforms, pistols, and grenades.
Bendera went to the garage and took one of the best cars on site, a Steyr reportedly used by the camp commandant himself, Rudolf Höss.
Then they drove calmly through the camp toward the exit.
As they got closer to the final gate, the barrier stayed down. Nobody moved. Seconds felt like hours. The men in the back were sure they’d been caught.
Then Piechowski leaned out the window and shouted at the guard like an angry SS officer.
The barrier went up.
They drove away and ditched the car later. All four escaped.
The Germans were humiliated. Some of the escapees’ families paid a terrible price. Jaster’s parents were sent to Auschwitz and died there.
But here’s the twist. Stanisław Jaster wasn’t just escaping. He was carrying something out. A report from inside the camp, written by Witold Pilecki, the man who volunteered to go into Auschwitz to expose it.
Piechowski joined the Polish resistance and kept fighting. When the war ended, communist Poland arrested him for having served in the Home Army and sent him to prison for years.
He lived to 98 and spent his later years telling his story.
A prisoner who spent two years in Auschwitz walked out through the front gate yelling at the guards. In the commandant’s car.
— @VoicesofWW2 Oct 17, 2026
(5) Michael Novakhov on X: ” #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Putin Putin The MISINVESTIGATION of 9/11 – The Missing Links: Russia, Germany, Israel Hypothesis thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com… PUTIN THE MASTERMIND The official narrative of the 9/11 attacks overlooks foreign state sponsorship, the non-state actors like Al-Qaeda x.com/mikenov/status/2…” / X x.com/mikenov/status/2111387…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Putin Putin
The MISINVESTIGATION of 9/11 – The Missing Links: Russia, Germany, Israel Hypothesis thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com…
PUTIN THE MASTERMIND
The official narrative of the 9/11 attacks overlooks foreign state sponsorship, the non-state actors like Al-Qaeda were merely “foot soldiers” rather than the true architects. The true “Mastermind” was Putin. It was his operation, one of the series of many, with the common contextual, conceptual, and operational patterns, bearing the traces of his complex political personality, including the traits of the Recruiter and the Uniter.
The post combines personal commentary, social media feeds, and search queries/AI responses to construct an alternative counterintelligence theory regarding the September 11 attacks.Putin’s reaction to this post: “It is EERIE, Pa. To change the official, the “al Qaeda” version of the results of the 9/11 investigation is like to try to BEND THE SILVER (FAST, EASY) RAIL.”
By “Silver Rail” Putin means the “Al Qaeda” version: “Do not bend the “Silver Rail”.
Search:
Erie, Pa
Bend, Silver Rail
That’s how he communicates: In accidents.The MISINVESTIGATION of 9/11, blaming the non-state “Al Qaeda” instead of the professional intelligence services of Russia, Germany, and Israel, demonstrated amply, that the FBI at that time was the INCOMPETENT, IMPOTENT BODY, totally subservient to the current Government. And it is not much different now.
Reinvestigate the 9/11, and reform the FBI!
Search:
MISINVESTIGATION of 9/11
MISINVESTIGATIONS of 9/11 by the FBI— https://x.com/mikenov/status/2111387570470834363— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 17, 2026
Hans Joachim Albert Litten (1903–1938) was a German-Jewish lawyer during the Weimar Republic who famously cross-examined Adolf Hitler in court to expose the violent and anti-democratic strategies of the Nazi Party….
Following a November 1930 attack by Nazi SA (Stormtroopers) on workers at Berlin’s Tanzpalast Eden (Eden Dance Palace)—which left three people dead and many injured—Litten sought to prove the violence was a systematic, top-down strategy ordered by party leaders.
A young Berlin lawyer forced Adolf Hitler to defend his movement under questioning. On May 8, 1931, Hans Litten summoned the Nazi leader as a witness in a criminal trial involving a violent attack by Nazi stormtroopers. Hitler was trying to present his party as a lawful political movement capable of gaining power through elections. Litten confronted him with evidence suggesting that violence and revolutionary ambitions remained central to Nazi politics. The encounter humiliated Hitler before he became dictator. Less than two years later, Litten was arrested by the regime he had challenged.
The case began with an attack at the Eden Dance Palace in Berlin on November 22, 1930. A group of approximately twenty Nazi stormtroopers assaulted a gathering organized by a left-wing workers’ club. Gunshots were fired, and several people were wounded. Germany’s Weimar Republic was already suffering intense political violence, with clashes involving Nazis, communists and other militant groups. The Nazi Party was expanding electorally while its paramilitary organization, the SA, intimidated opponents in the streets. Hitler publicly emphasized a legal route to power, but Litten believed the party’s violent methods contradicted that promise.
Litten represented injured participants in proceedings against those accused of the assault. His approach was unusual. Instead of confining his questions to the immediate actions of the defendants, he sought to establish the broader relationship between the Nazi leadership and organized political violence. He requested that Hitler himself be summoned to explain the party’s position. The court accepted the request. On May 8, Hitler appeared as a witness before a Berlin judge, required to answer questions rather than deliver a speech to supporters. For a politician who depended on controlling his public image, the courtroom created a situation in which a young opposing lawyer could press him directly.
Litten challenged Hitler about Nazi propaganda and the behavior of the SA. He drew attention to writings that promoted revolutionary methods and argued that the movement’s public commitment to legality was difficult to reconcile with its rhetoric and street violence. Hitler insisted that the Nazi Party intended to obtain power through lawful means and distanced himself from statements suggesting otherwise. The questioning was combative, and contemporary accounts describe Hitler becoming visibly agitated. Litten did not obtain a confession that Hitler personally ordered the Eden attack. The significance of the examination was that he made the party leader answer publicly for the contradiction between Nazi claims of legality and the actions associated with his movement.
The hearing damaged Hitler’s preferred presentation of his party and placed Litten in a dangerous position. Other lawyers were challenging Nazi violence, but Litten had confronted the movement’s leader personally at a moment when Nazi political power was growing. He continued working on cases involving political extremism and defending people targeted by the far right. The trial did not stop the Nazi Party’s rise. Hitler became chancellor on January 30, 1933, and his government rapidly dismantled constitutional protections. The Reichstag fire in February provided a pretext for mass arrests of political opponents.
— @archeohistories Oct 17, 2026
The man erased from the 1948 photograph is Vlado Clementis, the Slovak Communist politician and Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia….
On February 21, 1948, Communist Party leader Klement Gottwald addressed a massive crowd from a balcony at the Kinsky Palace in Prague during the Czechoslovak coup d’état. Standing next to him in the cold was Vlado Clementis, who handed his fur cap to Gottwald to keep his head warm. Clementis later fell out of favor with the regime during Stalinist political purges, was accused of “bourgeois nationalism,” tried, and executed by hanging in 1952. State censors airbrushed Clementis out of official photographs and history books so it would appear as though he had never existed. However, the retouchers left behind the fur hat resting on Gottwald’s head. This eerie piece of state censorship was famously referenced by writer Milan Kundera in his 1978 novel, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting.
…. . . . .
A communist government removed an executed official from a photograph of its own rise to power. The original image showed Czechoslovak Communist leader Klement Gottwald speaking in Prague in February 1948, with fellow politician Vladimír Clementis standing nearby. After Clementis fell victim to a Stalinist political purge, an altered version of the photograph appeared without him. Another man visible in the original image was also removed. Yet the famous picture continued circulating, preserving the scene while changing who had been present. The manipulation became one of the most memorable examples of political censorship in communist Eastern Europe.
The photograph was taken on February 21, 1948, at a communist demonstration in Prague’s Old Town Square. Czechoslovakia was experiencing a severe government crisis that would soon end with the Communist Party consolidating control of the state. Gottwald, then prime minister and Communist Party chairman, addressed a large crowd from the balcony of the Kinský Palace. Clementis, a prominent Slovak communist who would later become foreign minister, stood beside him. The photographer Karel Hájek was also visible behind the main speaker. News photographs of the gathering became part of the visual record of the Communist Party’s ascent to power.
The crisis culminated on February 25, when President Edvard Beneš accepted changes that enabled Gottwald’s communist-led government to take control. The new regime increasingly eliminated political opposition and brought institutions under Communist Party authority. Clementis initially remained an influential figure within that system. He served as foreign minister after the 1948 takeover, participating in the government that had consolidated communist rule. Yet Stalinist purges soon turned against senior party officials themselves. Former comrades were accused of espionage, nationalism and conspiracy, often through politically orchestrated investigations and trials.
Clementis was arrested and eventually placed among the defendants in the notorious trial associated with former party leader Rudolf Slánský. The proceedings relied on coerced confessions and fabricated accusations. In November 1952, the defendants were convicted, and Clementis was among those sentenced to death. He was executed on December 3, 1952. The government that had once presented him as a trusted member of its leadership now classified him as a traitor. His previous public role became something official propaganda sought to conceal. Altered photographs were one means of removing evidence of his participation from the regime’s preferred version of its history.
— @archeohistories Oct 17, 2026
Mikhail Gorbachev freed the famous dissident Andrei Sakharov
(a Nobel Peace Prize-winning nuclear physicist and human rights champion, had been confined to the closed city of Gorky since 1980 for criticizing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) from internal exile in December 1986. In a historic move that signaled his new policy of glasnost (openness), Gorbachev personally telephoned Sakharov to tell him that he and his wife, Yelena Bonner, were free to return to Moscow. Shortly after releasing Sakharov, Gorbachev expanded his political reforms by freeing hundreds of other high-profile dissidents and “refuseniks”….A telephone appeared in a dissident’s apartment after years of enforced isolation. On December 15, 1986, Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, received an unexpected visit from technicians accompanied by a KGB officer. They installed a telephone in the couple’s apartment in the closed city of Gorky, where Sakharov had been held in internal exile since 1980. The following afternoon, the telephone rang. At the other end was Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, informing Sakharov that he and his wife would be allowed to return to Moscow.
Sakharov was internationally famous for his scientific work on Soviet nuclear weapons and his increasingly public defense of human rights. He had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, an honor Soviet authorities prevented him from collecting in person. His criticism of political repression and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought him into direct conflict with the government. In January 1980, he was sent without trial to Gorky, a city closed to most foreigners. Isolation there made contact with Western diplomats and journalists difficult. The KGB closely monitored his movements and communications, while his public dissent continued to infuriate the authorities.
Exile did not silence him. Sakharov protested restrictions on himself and Bonner and undertook hunger strikes over matters involving their family and personal freedom. His treatment included forced hospitalization and other coercive measures. Bonner became central to his ability to communicate with the outside world, carrying information and defending their rights despite intense pressure. The authorities periodically restricted correspondence, visits and telephone access. By the mid-1980s, Sakharov had become a prominent symbol of the broader Soviet problem of prisoners of conscience: people punished not for ordinary violent crimes but for expressing political or moral opposition to the state.
Gorbachev’s rise to power in March 1985 gradually altered the political landscape. He pursued reforms intended to address economic stagnation and improve Soviet governance while also seeking better relations with Western countries. The continued confinement of a Nobel laureate was an international embarrassment and a test of the sincerity of the new leadership’s promises. Sakharov had written to Gorbachev urging the release of political prisoners. In December 1986, the death of dissident Anatoly Marchenko following a prolonged hunger strike added urgency to the issue. It was in this atmosphere that the Soviet leadership decided to end Sakharov’s exile.
The details of the telephone call are unusually well documented. In his later account, Sakharov recalled the technicians arriving on December 15 and installing the telephone under security supervision. On December 16, the anticipated call came at approximately three in the afternoon. Gorbachev personally told him he could return to Moscow and resume his scientific work. Sakharov responded by raising the fate of other political prisoners, refusing to treat his own release as a complete solution. The conversation therefore went beyond an announcement of personal freedom. It also exposed the continuing disagreement between the dissident and the Soviet leadership over human rights.
— @archeohistories Oct 17, 2026
In August 1942, at a late-night dinner in the Kremlin during Winston Churchill’s visit to Moscow. Churchill asked Stalin whether the personal stresses of fighting World War II had been as difficult for him as enforcing the policy of agricultural collectivization. Churchill remarked that he thought collectivization would have been worse because it meant fighting millions of small farmers and peasants rather than a defined class of aristocrats or large landowners….
Winston Churchill asked Stalin whether destroying peasant resistance had been harder than fighting Germany. The question came during Churchill’s visit to Moscow in August 1942, when Britain and the Soviet Union were military allies against Nazi Germany. According to Churchill’s later account, Stalin acknowledged that collectivizing Soviet agriculture had involved an enormous struggle affecting millions of people. He nevertheless defended the policy as necessary for the country’s development. The conversation offered an unusual glimpse of how the Soviet dictator justified one of the most destructive campaigns of his rule.
Churchill had travelled to Moscow on an uncomfortable diplomatic mission. The Red Army was under immense pressure, and Stalin wanted Britain and the United States to open a second major front against Germany in Western Europe. Churchill had to explain why such an invasion could not take place in 1942. Their discussions were frequently tense, with Stalin criticizing Allied military strategy and Churchill defending decisions made in London and Washington. Yet the two leaders also needed each other. Their governments were separated by deep ideological hostility, but defeating Hitler required cooperation despite those differences.
During their discussions, Churchill raised a question about Soviet collectivization. Stalin had imposed the policy beginning in the late 1920s, replacing much of private peasant farming with collective agricultural enterprises controlled by the state. The campaign involved coercion, mass deportations, executions, confiscation of property and the destruction of established rural communities. Resistance was met with severe repression. Agricultural disruption and state grain procurement policies contributed to catastrophic famine in the early 1930s, particularly in Ukraine and other agricultural regions. Churchill knew that the policy had caused immense suffering, but he was now speaking directly to the man who had ordered and defended it.
In his wartime memoir The Hinge of Fate, Churchill recalled asking Stalin whether the struggle over collectivization had been more difficult than the war. Stalin reportedly responded that it had been extraordinarily severe and had continued for several years. When Churchill referred to the millions of ordinary peasants involved, Stalin answered by invoking ten million people. That figure has sometimes been repeated as though Stalin had confessed to killing exactly ten million peasants. Churchill’s account does not support such a precise interpretation. The number arose in a discussion of the scale of upheaval, repression and resistance, not as a verified statistical accounting of deaths.
Stalin’s explanation, as Churchill remembered it, centered on economic necessity. He argued that Soviet agriculture had to be mechanized and reorganized to prevent future shortages and improve production. The peasants had resisted because the new system threatened their traditional way of life and control over their land. Stalin described the campaign as a terrible struggle but insisted that the government had been compelled to carry it out. His justification treated collective farming as a requirement of national modernization, even while acknowledging the suffering associated with its introduction. The distinction between acknowledging hardship and accepting personal responsibility for crimes remained fundamental.
— @archeohistories Oct 17, 2026
State-Actor Hypotheses: Certain fringe political commentators suggest the FBI deliberately misdirected blame toward al-Qaeda to mask the alleged involvement of other foreign intelligence services.
The MISINVESTIGATIONS of 9/11 – Google Search google.com/search?q=The+MISI…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 17, 2026
New details emerge on the activities of former #BND chief August #Hanning, who is under investigation by #Germany’s Federal Prosecutor’s Office for suspected espionage and treason. Who his potential clients were remains under investigation. What is clear is that he maintained sustained contact with #Putin’s inner circle.
– Hanning maintained privileged access to, and a degree of personal rapport with, one of Putin’s most senior and long-serving security figures.
– After retiring in 2009, he continued ongoing contact with Nikolai Patrushev, a longtime close associate of Vladimir Putin (both from St. Petersburg with KGB backgrounds).
– Patrushev succeeded Putin as FSB head in 1999 and later served as Secretary of the National Security Council during the 2014 Crimea annexation and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
– Key documented contacts:
– As sitting BND chief, Hanning visited the war-damaged Chechen cities of Grozny and Gudermes in 2000 (criticized by the Greens and others as taking Russia’s side).
– 2014 (shortly after Crimea): Meeting with Patrushev, described by a friendly source as an attempt to warn of “negative consequences” (confirmed by Hanning’s lawyer).
– 2016: Attendance at a Moscow security conference opened by Patrushev, where Hanning advocated counter-terror cooperation with Russia, criticized sanctions, and called for jointly solving the “Ukraine problem.”
– 2019: Arctic Council-related visit to the Valaam Monastery (a Russian elite refuge on Lake Ladoga). A group photo shows Hanning standing next to Patrushev.
– Hanning’s repeated meetings with Nikolai Patrushev—including after Crimea and while advocating cooperation with Russia on Ukraine—demonstrate a striking degree of personal access to Putin’s inner circle that is difficult to reconcile with the role of a Western intelligence chief, even if the current espionage investigation centers more on other clients.
– What explains this level of access—and was it purely personal, or did it serve other purposes? The investigation may yet provide answers.
faz.net/aktuell/politik/inla…— @Shtuni Oct 17, 2026
9/11 Facts: Explore the evidence, make up your own mind | 911Truth.Org 911truth.org/
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 17, 2026