Month: August 2026

Russian Influence vs. Israeli Religious Politics – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Russian+…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026

#CIA  #FBI  #Mossad
It is complicated …
x.com/mikenov/status/2086800…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov)GLOBAL  #SECURITY AND  #INTELLIGENCE  #NEWS REVIEW
THE CRISIS OF MOSSAD AND THE CRISIS OF ISRAEL

The corruption of  the wide spread money laundering and the “hardline nationalism”, or to be direct, the RACISM, stream down through every ex-Soviet pore in Israeli society, and it is while 400,000  of them are not recognized as “halachically” citizens.
Clash with Religious Authorities: Despite their hawkish nationalist voting patterns, most FSU immigrants are thoroughly secular or atheist. A profound institutional tension exists because an estimated 400,000 citizens from this immigration wave are not considered halachically Jewish by Israel’s Orthodox Chief Rabbinate.

The corrupting influence of the hypocritical, hardline, conservative religious politics (of “Putin Jews”) on the Israeli society

The convergence of hardline nationalism and religious politics among certain factions of the Russian-speaking electorate is a heavily debated topic that shapes contemporary Israeli society. While the term “Putin Jews” is a colloquial and highly politicized label—often used by critics to describe recent right-wing Russian immigrants—the broader impact of post-Soviet immigration on Israel’s political and religious landscapes is well-documented. [1]
The Secular Right-Wing and Religious Polarization
The political profile of the massive wave of over one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) is unique. Unlike native-born Israeli factions, the FSU electorate often combines hardline hawkish nationalism with fierce secularism. This creates distinct societal impacts: [1]

Nationalist Realignment: Many post-Soviet immigrants hold a deeply skeptical view of territorial concessions and peace agreements. Critics argue this hawkish stance has strengthened right-wing populism, entrenching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and shifting the national consensus further toward annexationist policies. [2, 3, 4]
Clash with Religious Authorities: Despite their hawkish nationalist voting patterns, most FSU immigrants are thoroughly secular or atheist. A profound institutional tension exists because an estimated 400,000 citizens from this immigration wave are not considered halachically Jewish by Israel’s Orthodox Chief Rabbinate. [5, 6]
The Fight for Civil Liberties: Political figures representing this base, such as Avigdor Lieberman and his party Yisrael Beiteinu, frequently target the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) establishment. They aggressively lobby against “religious coercion,” advocating for secular civil marriage, public transit on Shabbat, and the conscription of Haredi yeshiva students into the military. [7, 8, 9]

Cultural and Democratic Critiques
Critics within Israel’s progressive and veteran secular circles express concern over how post-Soviet political traditions intersect with Israeli democracy. [3]

Perceptions of Authority: Sociologists point out that some immigrant factions brought a political culture influenced by Soviet-style authoritarian structures, favoring strongman leadership over fluid democratic norms. Critics contend this has eroded democratic institutional checks and balances. [3, 4]
Social Fragmentation: Rather than fully integrating into a singular melting pot, parts of the Russian-speaking community operate as a highly independent cultural and political bloc. This reinforces a trend where Israeli society is split into parallel, self-contained tribal identities that struggle to find common civic ground. [3, 10]

Conversely, defenders argue that the post-Soviet aliyah revitalized Israel’s economy, technology sector, and military infrastructure. They maintain that the community’s fierce nationalism is a legitimate patriotic response from citizens who face immediate security threats and have sacrificed heavily in defending the state. [1, 3, 11, 12]

[1]  youtube.com
[2]  bbc.com
[3]  theguardian.com
[4]  facebook.com
[5]  en.wikipedia.org
[6]  blogs.timesofisrael.com
[7]  en.wikipedia.org
[8]  brookings.edu
[9]  ridl.io
[10]  jns.org
[11]  jpost.com
[12]  ideas.tikvah.org
–

Google Search:
google.com/search?udm=50&sou…—  https://x.com/mikenov/status/2086800769697640583

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026

GLOBAL  #SECURITY AND  #INTELLIGENCE  #NEWS REVIEW
THE CRISIS OF MOSSAD AND THE CRISIS OF ISRAEL

The corruption of  the wide spread money laundering and the “hardline nationalism”, or to be direct, the RACISM, stream down through every ex-Soviet pore in Israeli society, and it is while 400,000  of them are not recognized as “halachically” citizens.
Clash with Religious Authorities: Despite their hawkish nationalist voting patterns, most FSU immigrants are thoroughly secular or atheist. A profound institutional tension exists because an estimated 400,000 citizens from this immigration wave are not considered halachically Jewish by Israel’s Orthodox Chief Rabbinate.

The corrupting influence of the hypocritical, hardline, conservative religious politics (of “Putin Jews”) on the Israeli society

The convergence of hardline nationalism and religious politics among certain factions of the Russian-speaking electorate is a heavily debated topic that shapes contemporary Israeli society. While the term “Putin Jews” is a colloquial and highly politicized label—often used by critics to describe recent right-wing Russian immigrants—the broader impact of post-Soviet immigration on Israel’s political and religious landscapes is well-documented. [1]
The Secular Right-Wing and Religious Polarization
The political profile of the massive wave of over one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) is unique. Unlike native-born Israeli factions, the FSU electorate often combines hardline hawkish nationalism with fierce secularism. This creates distinct societal impacts: [1]

Nationalist Realignment: Many post-Soviet immigrants hold a deeply skeptical view of territorial concessions and peace agreements. Critics argue this hawkish stance has strengthened right-wing populism, entrenching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and shifting the national consensus further toward annexationist policies. [2, 3, 4]
Clash with Religious Authorities: Despite their hawkish nationalist voting patterns, most FSU immigrants are thoroughly secular or atheist. A profound institutional tension exists because an estimated 400,000 citizens from this immigration wave are not considered halachically Jewish by Israel’s Orthodox Chief Rabbinate. [5, 6]
The Fight for Civil Liberties: Political figures representing this base, such as Avigdor Lieberman and his party Yisrael Beiteinu, frequently target the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) establishment. They aggressively lobby against “religious coercion,” advocating for secular civil marriage, public transit on Shabbat, and the conscription of Haredi yeshiva students into the military. [7, 8, 9]

Cultural and Democratic Critiques
Critics within Israel’s progressive and veteran secular circles express concern over how post-Soviet political traditions intersect with Israeli democracy. [3]

Perceptions of Authority: Sociologists point out that some immigrant factions brought a political culture influenced by Soviet-style authoritarian structures, favoring strongman leadership over fluid democratic norms. Critics contend this has eroded democratic institutional checks and balances. [3, 4]
Social Fragmentation: Rather than fully integrating into a singular melting pot, parts of the Russian-speaking community operate as a highly independent cultural and political bloc. This reinforces a trend where Israeli society is split into parallel, self-contained tribal identities that struggle to find common civic ground. [3, 10]

Conversely, defenders argue that the post-Soviet aliyah revitalized Israel’s economy, technology sector, and military infrastructure. They maintain that the community’s fierce nationalism is a legitimate patriotic response from citizens who face immediate security threats and have sacrificed heavily in defending the state. [1, 3, 11, 12]

[1]  youtube.com
[2]  bbc.com
[3]  theguardian.com
[4]  facebook.com
[5]  en.wikipedia.org
[6]  blogs.timesofisrael.com
[7]  en.wikipedia.org
[8]  brookings.edu
[9]  ridl.io
[10]  jns.org
[11]  jpost.com
[12]  ideas.tikvah.org
–

Google Search:
google.com/search?udm=50&sou…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026

The corruption of  the wide spread money laundering and the “hardline nationalism”, or to be direct, the RACISM, stream down through every ex-Soviet pore
in Israeli society, and it is while 400,000  of them are not recognized as “halachically” citizens.
Clash with Religious Authorities: Despite their hawkish nationalist voting patterns, most FSU immigrants are thoroughly secular or atheist. A profound institutional tension exists because an estimated 400,000 citizens from this immigration wave are not considered halachically Jewish by Israel’s Orthodox Chief Rabbinate.

The corrupting influence of the hypocritical, hardline, conservative religious politics (of “Putin Jews”) on the Israeli society

The convergence of hardline nationalism and religious politics among certain factions of the Russian-speaking electorate is a heavily debated topic that shapes contemporary Israeli society. While the term “Putin Jews” is a colloquial and highly politicized label—often used by critics to describe recent right-wing Russian immigrants—the broader impact of post-Soviet immigration on Israel’s political and religious landscapes is well-documented. [1]
The Secular Right-Wing and Religious Polarization
The political profile of the massive wave of over one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) is unique. Unlike native-born Israeli factions, the FSU electorate often combines hardline hawkish nationalism with fierce secularism. This creates distinct societal impacts: [1]

Nationalist Realignment: Many post-Soviet immigrants hold a deeply skeptical view of territorial concessions and peace agreements. Critics argue this hawkish stance has strengthened right-wing populism, entrenching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and shifting the national consensus further toward annexationist policies. [2, 3, 4]
Clash with Religious Authorities: Despite their hawkish nationalist voting patterns, most FSU immigrants are thoroughly secular or atheist. A profound institutional tension exists because an estimated 400,000 citizens from this immigration wave are not considered halachically Jewish by Israel’s Orthodox Chief Rabbinate. [5, 6]
The Fight for Civil Liberties: Political figures representing this base, such as Avigdor Lieberman and his party Yisrael Beiteinu, frequently target the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) establishment. They aggressively lobby against “religious coercion,” advocating for secular civil marriage, public transit on Shabbat, and the conscription of Haredi yeshiva students into the military. [7, 8, 9]

Cultural and Democratic Critiques
Critics within Israel’s progressive and veteran secular circles express concern over how post-Soviet political traditions intersect with Israeli democracy. [3]

Perceptions of Authority: Sociologists point out that some immigrant factions brought a political culture influenced by Soviet-style authoritarian structures, favoring strongman leadership over fluid democratic norms. Critics contend this has eroded democratic institutional checks and balances. [3, 4]
Social Fragmentation: Rather than fully integrating into a singular melting pot, parts of the Russian-speaking community operate as a highly independent cultural and political bloc. This reinforces a trend where Israeli society is split into parallel, self-contained tribal identities that struggle to find common civic ground. [3, 10]

Conversely, defenders argue that the post-Soviet aliyah revitalized Israel’s economy, technology sector, and military infrastructure. They maintain that the community’s fierce nationalism is a legitimate patriotic response from citizens who face immediate security threats and have sacrificed heavily in defending the state. [1, 3, 11, 12]

[1]  youtube.com
[2]  bbc.com
[3]  theguardian.com
[4]  facebook.com
[5]  en.wikipedia.org
[6]  blogs.timesofisrael.com
[7]  en.wikipedia.org
[8]  brookings.edu
[9]  ridl.io
[10]  jns.org
[11]  jpost.com
[12]  ideas.tikvah.org
–

Google Search:
google.com/search?udm=50&sou…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026

Israeli ultra-Orthodox party threatens to topple government – YouTube  youtube.com/watch?v=AATtcZCj…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026

The Latest Assessment: What ails  #Mossad?
Quote (and it puts it quite mildly):
#Ideological Shift: The rise of hardline, conservative religious  #politics
has shifted national priorities away from secular defense pragmatism toward messianic and ethnocentric paradigms, straining relations with traditional military and intelligence brass who favor institutional norms and regional stability.

What ails Mossad? Did it become too political under Netanyahu and Yossi Cohen? What are the corrupting influences of the conservative orthodox judaism? – Google Search  google.com/search?q=What+ail…

AI Overview
Mossad faced intense scrutiny under  Benjamin Netanyahu  and former director  Yossi Cohen , as critics argue the agency’s traditional apolitical stance was compromised by personal political ambitions, high-profile media operations, and the growing influence of right-wing religious coalitions in Israeli governance. [1, 2]
Politicization Under Netanyahu and Yossi Cohen

Blurred Lines:  Observers argue that Yossi Cohen acted as a political extension of Benjamin Netanyahu, using high-visibility intelligence coups—such as seizing Iran’s nuclear archives—to bolster both leaders’ public profiles .
Succession Ambitions: Cohen was widely viewed as Netanyahu’s preferred political successor, leading to accusations that his operational decisions and media exposure were tailored to build a personal political brand rather than maintain institutional neutrality.
Post-Tenure Fallout: After leaving office, Cohen openly critiqued the political and military establishment, eventually calling for Netanyahu to step aside, which further highlighted the deep entanglement of intelligence leadership with partisan politics.
Personal Scandals: Cohen’s tenure faced distractions from ethical controversies, including accepted gifts from billionaires and unauthorized disclosures, raising concerns about compromised institutional integrity. [10]

Influence of Conservative and Ultra-Orthodox Politics

Conscription Disparities: A central friction point in Israeli society involves exemptions from military and national service for ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men, a policy heavily defended by Netanyahu’s political coalitions to maintain power.
Erosion of Shared Burden: Critics argue that prioritizing sectarian political survival over universal civic duty creates a moral hazard, fracturing the egalitarian ethos traditionally expected within Israel’s security ecosystem.
Ideological Shift: The rise of hardline, conservative religious politics has shifted national priorities away from secular defense pragmatism toward messianic and ethnocentric paradigms, straining relations with traditional military and intelligence brass who favor institutional norms and regional stability.

AI responses may include mistakes.

[1]  youtube.com/watch?v=_V7zV3Gq…
[2]  iranpress.com/content/309729…
[3]  timesofisrael.com/wading-int…
[4]  timesofisrael.com/in-stunnin…
[5]  youtube.com/watch?v=_V7zV3Gq…
[6]  timesofisrael.com/liveblog_e…
[7]  timesofisrael.com/ex-mossad-…
[8]  thejc.com/news/israel/former…
[9]  timesofisrael.com/wading-int…
[10]  drucker10.net/?p=4056
[11]  jpost.com/israel-news/articl…
[12]  jpost.com/israel-news/articl…
[13]  youtube.com/watch?v=AATtcZCj…
–

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026

#CIA  #DIA  #Mossad
x.com/mikenov/status/2086782…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov)GLOBAL  #SECURITY AND  #INTELLIGENCE  #NEWS REVIEW
The Latest Assessment
x.com/mikenov/status/2086782…—  https://x.com/mikenov/status/2086782433215598620

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026

GLOBAL  #SECURITY AND  #INTELLIGENCE  #NEWS REVIEW
The Latest Assessment
x.com/mikenov/status/2086782…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #MeccaAgreement  #NATO  #LatestVerdict
The (Latest) Verdict:
The Mecca Agreement will likely succeed as a “NATO satellite”.
share.google/aimode/mblwHYEW…
Whether the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will “work” depends entirely on how success is defined: it is highly functional as a geopolitical deterrent and a vehicle for defense technology sharing, but it is unlikely to operate as a tightly integrated, offensive military bloc like Western NATO. Signed on August 7, 2026, by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, the pact features a collective-defense clause—stipulating that an armed attack on one is an attack on all—sparking widespread global debate. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
The Strategic Synergy: What Makes it Viable
The alliance relies on a highly complementary “strategic triangle” where each member fills a critical gap for the others: [3]

Saudi Arabia (The Purse & The Heart): Brings immense financial capital to fund joint ventures and deep religious legitimacy as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. [6, 7, 8]
Türkiye (The Industrial Core): Offers a sophisticated, rapidly growing indigenous defense industry (including advanced drones and electronic warfare) combined with decades of institutional NATO experience. [4, 9, 10, 11, 12]
Pakistan (The Muscle & Deterrent): Contributes a massive, battle-tested standing military and holds the distinction of being the alliance’s sole nuclear-armed power. [7, 9, 10]

Key Reasons It Will Work (The Advantages)

Credible Regional Deterrent: The pact serves as an immediate warning to regional actors like Iran and the Houthis. Following a series of missile and drone strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure, the explicit collective-defense clause raises the stakes of future aggression by threatening to draw in Turkish and Pakistani forces. [5, 13, 14]
Strategic Portfolio Diversification: None of the members have to abandon their existing global ties. Türkiye remains a vital NATO member, Saudi Arabia maintains its core security architecture with Washington, and Pakistan preserves its critical relationships with China. [7, 15]
Industrial Integration: It formalizes and accelerates tech-sharing, joint military exercises, and arms sales—such as Pakistan’s acquisition of Turkish aerospace tech and Saudi funding for joint hardware development. [2, 4, 9, 10]

Why It May Falter (The Obstacles)

Diverging Geopolitical Priorities: The three countries do not share a single, unified enemy. Saudi Arabia’s primary focus is protecting its domestic infrastructure from Iran-backed proxies. Türkiye is focused on the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, and its Western NATO obligations. Pakistan’s military doctrine remains heavily consumed by its borders with India. [2, 7, 9, 13, 16]
Ambiguity in Operational Commitment: While Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan noted the treaty is technically comparable to NATO’s Article 5, regional experts point out that the fine print regarding mandatory military deployment remains vague. In past crises, Pakistan has resisted deploying troops to fight Saudi Arabia’s external conflicts. [2, 6, 17, 18, 19]
Economic Limitations: Pakistan is grappling with chronic economic instability, meaning its operational deployment capabilities depend entirely on continuous financial underwriting from Riyadh. [4, 7, 9]

The Verdict
The Mecca Agreement will likely succeed as a “NATO satellite” and a robust defense-industrial partnership rather than a standalone global superpower bloc. It will effectively boost the defensive capabilities of its members, optimize their military supply chains, and act as a diplomatic shield. However, observers should view it as a pragmatic tool for self-reliance and regional deterrence in an unpredictable multi-polar world, rather than a rigid, monolithic religious alliance. [2, 4, 7, 10, 20]

[1]  instagram.com
[2]  inss.org.il
[3]  timesofindia.indiatimes.com
[4]  ynetnews.com
[5]  atlanticcouncil.org
[6]  reuters.com
[7]  aljazeera.com
[8]  escudodigital.com
[9]  facebook.com
[10]  nbcnews.com
[11]  raksha-anirveda.com
[12]  instagram.com
[13]  irananalytica.org
[14]  cnn.com
[15]  m.thewire.in
[16]  mepei.com
[17]  blogs.timesofisrael.com
[18]  reuters.com
[19]  youtube.com
[20]  instagram.com
–
Pic.:
The Mecca Agreement’s Fatal Flaw: It Only Works Until Washington Says No
x.com/GreekReporterr/status/…—  https://x.com/mikenov/status/2086782074061529380

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026

#MeccaAgreement  #NATO  #LatestVerdict
The (Latest) Verdict:
The Mecca Agreement will likely succeed as a “NATO satellite”.
share.google/aimode/mblwHYEW…
Whether the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will “work” depends entirely on how success is defined: it is highly functional as a geopolitical deterrent and a vehicle for defense technology sharing, but it is unlikely to operate as a tightly integrated, offensive military bloc like Western NATO. Signed on August 7, 2026, by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, the pact features a collective-defense clause—stipulating that an armed attack on one is an attack on all—sparking widespread global debate. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
The Strategic Synergy: What Makes it Viable
The alliance relies on a highly complementary “strategic triangle” where each member fills a critical gap for the others: [3]

Saudi Arabia (The Purse & The Heart): Brings immense financial capital to fund joint ventures and deep religious legitimacy as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. [6, 7, 8]
Türkiye (The Industrial Core): Offers a sophisticated, rapidly growing indigenous defense industry (including advanced drones and electronic warfare) combined with decades of institutional NATO experience. [4, 9, 10, 11, 12]
Pakistan (The Muscle & Deterrent): Contributes a massive, battle-tested standing military and holds the distinction of being the alliance’s sole nuclear-armed power. [7, 9, 10]

Key Reasons It Will Work (The Advantages)

Credible Regional Deterrent: The pact serves as an immediate warning to regional actors like Iran and the Houthis. Following a series of missile and drone strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure, the explicit collective-defense clause raises the stakes of future aggression by threatening to draw in Turkish and Pakistani forces. [5, 13, 14]
Strategic Portfolio Diversification: None of the members have to abandon their existing global ties. Türkiye remains a vital NATO member, Saudi Arabia maintains its core security architecture with Washington, and Pakistan preserves its critical relationships with China. [7, 15]
Industrial Integration: It formalizes and accelerates tech-sharing, joint military exercises, and arms sales—such as Pakistan’s acquisition of Turkish aerospace tech and Saudi funding for joint hardware development. [2, 4, 9, 10]

Why It May Falter (The Obstacles)

Diverging Geopolitical Priorities: The three countries do not share a single, unified enemy. Saudi Arabia’s primary focus is protecting its domestic infrastructure from Iran-backed proxies. Türkiye is focused on the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, and its Western NATO obligations. Pakistan’s military doctrine remains heavily consumed by its borders with India. [2, 7, 9, 13, 16]
Ambiguity in Operational Commitment: While Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan noted the treaty is technically comparable to NATO’s Article 5, regional experts point out that the fine print regarding mandatory military deployment remains vague. In past crises, Pakistan has resisted deploying troops to fight Saudi Arabia’s external conflicts. [2, 6, 17, 18, 19]
Economic Limitations: Pakistan is grappling with chronic economic instability, meaning its operational deployment capabilities depend entirely on continuous financial underwriting from Riyadh. [4, 7, 9]

The Verdict
The Mecca Agreement will likely succeed as a “NATO satellite” and a robust defense-industrial partnership rather than a standalone global superpower bloc. It will effectively boost the defensive capabilities of its members, optimize their military supply chains, and act as a diplomatic shield. However, observers should view it as a pragmatic tool for self-reliance and regional deterrence in an unpredictable multi-polar world, rather than a rigid, monolithic religious alliance. [2, 4, 7, 10, 20]

[1]  instagram.com
[2]  inss.org.il
[3]  timesofindia.indiatimes.com
[4]  ynetnews.com
[5]  atlanticcouncil.org
[6]  reuters.com
[7]  aljazeera.com
[8]  escudodigital.com
[9]  facebook.com
[10]  nbcnews.com
[11]  raksha-anirveda.com
[12]  instagram.com
[13]  irananalytica.org
[14]  cnn.com
[15]  m.thewire.in
[16]  mepei.com
[17]  blogs.timesofisrael.com
[18]  reuters.com
[19]  youtube.com
[20]  instagram.com
–
Pic.:
The Mecca Agreement’s Fatal Flaw: It Only Works Until Washington Says No
x.com/GreekReporterr/status/…Greek Report 🇬🇷 (@GreekReporterr)The Mecca Agreement’s Fatal Flaw: It Only Works Until Washington Says No

Why the Mecca Agreement is dead on arrival?

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement declares that an attack on Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan is an attack on all three.

On paper, deterrence. In practice, the clause is hollow.

All three depend on the United States for arms, training and security guarantees. None can afford to trigger a clause that pits them against Washington, NATO or Israel.

Riyadh’s F-15s, Pakistan’s economy, Ankara’s F-16 pipeline and NATO membership all run through American goodwill.

A pact built on Islamic solidarity cannot override that dependency, which means it carries no real weight against the West, against Israel, or by extension against Greece and Cyprus.

Compare that with the Greece-Cyprus-Israel framework, increasingly joined by India: no sweeping automatic-trigger rhetoric, just joint exercises, intelligence sharing, special-forces interoperability and technology transfer, built step by step on interests that actually converge.

Symbolic pacts photograph well. Structural ones deter.

-Greek Report—  https://x.com/GreekReporterr/status/2086177501768794614

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026

Oil Prices Climb on Stalemate in Strait of Hormuz – The New York Times  nytimes.com/2026/08/09/busin…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Aug 10, 2026