A Cuban salsa teacher living in #Russia, Oemis Romagoza Durruthy (35), coordinated a 2024 wave of arson and sabotage across at least 4 #EU countries on behalf of Russian intelligence ( #GRU).
– On Tuesday, September 15, 2026, the U.S. Justice Department charged Romagoza as one of 5 alleged members of a Russia-linked network with conspiracy to provide material support to #terrorism. The others are:
– Yuri Khrameev (63), ex-colonel in Russian intelligence
– Kirill Khrameev (27), an #FSB officer and Yuri’s son
– Yaidel Delgado Suarez (35), Cuban recruiter
– Angel Eduardo Castro (22), Venezuelan recruiter
– Romagoza recruited mostly Spanish-speaking “disposable agents” via Telegram and Facebook, then directed them remotely.
– The recruits were often cash-strapped people looking for work or hoping to fight in #Ukraine.
– Romagoza never met the recruits in person. He arranged travel, lodging, and pointed them to the targets.
– They included construction-supply firms in #Poland, a bus garage in #Czechia, a recycling plant in #Romania, equipment bound for Ukraine from #Lithuania, etc.
– Lithuania put him on an international wanted list.
– At least a dozen people were recruited and 9 have been caught.
– Romagoza has lived in Russia for at least 7 years, teaches Latin dance at a Petrozavodsk studio called Made in Cuba, married a Russian woman, and obtained Russian citizenship.
– The story is part of a broader pattern: after many Russian diplomats were expelled, Moscow turned to cheap, deniable online recruits for arson, parcel bombs, and other attacks meant to disrupt aid to Ukraine and project reach.
– Similar incidents continued into 2026.
– The Iranian- and #IRGC-linked group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyya ( #HAYI) used a similar disposable-recruit pattern in a 2026 wave of attacks on #Jewish and Israeli targets across Europe, and especially in #London.
– Not surprisingly Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi, the IRGC-linked operative describe as the key coordinator of the HAYI campaign, was reportedly en route to Moscow when he was arrested in Turkey and handed over to U.S. authorities.
– Russia was already on his travel map well before he was detained in Turkey.
– That reported destination is the point of overlap. Russia is not only running its own cut-out sabotage networks but it has also become a reported waypoint for an IRGC-linked coordinator using the same disposable-agent model.
– Whether Al-Saadi was headed there for sanctuary or for coordination, Moscow sits at the junction of two campaigns that outsource violence and sabotage in #Europe to cheap, deniable recruits.
dw.com/en/cuban-dance-teache…— @Shtuni Sep 16, 2026
Day: September 16, 2026
Russian Intelligence Network Charged in $40,000 Murder-for-Hire Plot on US Soil
The DOJ charged five people tied to Russian intelligence with running a network that allegedly offered a Brooklyn man $40,000 to assassinate a Russian dissident in the…
— @BeezLoop Sep 16, 2026
The Chechen story is central in the Hamburg Cell plot. Does it indicate the involvement of FSB in the 9/11?
Litvinenko: Russia possessed a degree of subterranean influence over Al-Qaeda’s leadership.
AI Mode
No, the Hamburg Cell’s Chechen story does not indicate the involvement of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in the 9/11 attacks. Instead, it represents a pivotal, accidental detour in the hijackers’ path from local radicalization to joining al-Qaeda.
According to the official 9/11 Commission Report, the “Chechen story” unfolded through a sequence of verified events: [1, 2]
1. The Original Goal was Chechnya, Not America
In late 1999, core members of the Hamburg Cell—including Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—became intensely radicalized by videos of Russian military actions during the Second Chechen War. Their initial intent was exclusively to travel to Chechnya to fight alongside Muslim separatists against the Russian military. They had no known connection to al-Qaeda or any plans to attack the United States at that time. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
2. The Train Encounter
While traveling on a German train east toward their intended destination, the cell members had a chance encounter with an al-Qaeda operative named Khalid al-Masri. Al-Masri convinced them that traveling directly into Chechnya was logistically too difficult due to closed borders and heavy Russian security. [2, 7]
He redirected them to a Mauritanian businessman named Mohamedou Ould Slahi, who advised them to travel first to Afghanistan to receive formal military training before trying to enter Chechnya. [2, 8]
3. The Hijacking by al-Qaeda
Once the Hamburg Cell arrived at al-Qaeda training camps in Kandahar, Afghanistan, their path changed permanently. Osama bin Laden and his military commanders realized that these men possessed rare, highly valuable traits for a transnational plot: they were fluent in Western languages, educated, and comfortable living in European societies. [5, 9]
Bin Laden personally intercepted them, informed them that they were not needed in Chechnya, and instead recruited them to become the operational core of the “Planes Operation”—which eventually became the 9/11 attacks. [6, 10, 11]
Summary
The Chechen conflict served as the emotional catalyst for the Hamburg Cell’s radicalization, but the connection was adversarial to Russia. Intelligence agencies and historians view the Chechen angle as evidence of how decentralized extremist networks operated at the time, rather than as an indicator of an FSB state-sponsored conspiracy. [3, 5][1] en.wikipedia.org
[2] washingtonpost.com
[3] nbcnews.com
[4] refworld.org
[5] en.wikipedia.org
[6] washingtonpost.com
[7] en.wikipedia.org
[8] nbcnews.com
[9] latimes.com
[10] amazon.com
[11] en.wikipedia.org
–AI Overview
The “Chechen story” does not indicate any involvement of the Russian FSB in the September 11 attacks.
The connection between the Hamburg Cell and Chechnya is a well-documented chapter in the history of the 9/11 plot, but extensive investigations by Western intelligence and the 9/11 Commission Report have established that this path was driven entirely by chance and standard Al-Qaeda recruitment corridors, rather than Russian state orchestration. [1, 2, 3]
What is the “Chechen Story”?
In late 1999, the core members of the Hamburg Cell (Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah) were radicalized in Germany, largely driven by internet propaganda and videos detailing Russian military atrocities against Muslims in Chechnya. [4, 5]
They decided to leave Germany to fight alongside Muslim separatists in the Second Chechen War. However, the route to Chechnya was highly restricted. While on a train in Germany, they had a chance encounter with an Islamist operative named Khalid al-Masri. Al-Masri put them in contact with Mohamedou Ould Slahi (an Al-Qaeda facilitator based in Germany), who advised them that traveling directly to Chechnya was too difficult. Instead, Slahi instructed them to travel to Afghanistan via Pakistan to receive training first. Once they arrived in Al-Qaeda’s camps, Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed recognized their technical skills and Western language fluencies, explicitly redirecting them from the Chechen battlefield to lead the “Planes Operation” against the United States. [1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9]
Where Do the FSB Theories Come From?
The idea that the FSB had a hand in 9/11 stems primarily from the controversial claims of Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer who defected to the UK and was assassinated with polonium-210 in 2006. [10, 11]
Litvinenko publicly asserted that the Russian secret services routinely infiltrated and manipulated global terrorist networks. Specifically, he claimed that Al-Qaeda’s number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had been detained by the FSB in Dagestan in 1997 and underwent training under Russian control before being released. Litvinenko used this allegation to suggest that Russia possessed a degree of subterranean influence over Al-Qaeda’s leadership. [12, 13, 14]
Why This Does Not Prove FSB Involvement
Mainstream historians, geopolitical analysts, and counterterrorism experts uniformly reject the premise of Russian state involvement in 9/11 for several distinct reasons:Inadvertent Radicalization, Not Orchestration: The Hamburg Cell was angered by Russian actions in Chechnya. Their original intent was to kill Russian soldiers, making any alignment with the FSB logistically and ideologically impossible.
The “Chance Encounter” Reality: The 9/11 Commission Report painstakingly detailed that the cell’s pivot from Chechnya to Afghanistan was an accident of geography and happenstance networking within European Salafist circles, not a deliberate redirect by a state actor.
Absence of Evidence: No declassified Western intelligence, German investigative findings, or internal Al-Qaeda documents found in Afghanistan have ever produced evidence supporting Litvinenko’s theory or showing an FSB link to the Hamburg cell.
Geopolitical Consequence: Structurally, the 9/11 attacks were deeply damaging to Russia’s geopolitical posture in Central Asia, as they immediately resulted in the United States establishing military bases in former Soviet republics (like Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan)—an outcome the Kremlin vehemently opposed.Ultimately, the Hamburg Cell’s Chechen fixation serves as an example of how local regional conflicts in the 1990s acted as global accelerators for radicalization, feeding impressionable young men directly into Al-Qaeda’s pre-existing logistics pipeline. [3, 5]
AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hambur…
[2] washingtonpost.com/archive/p…
[3] nbcnews.com/id/wbna5654550
[4] refworld.org/reference/resea…
[5] nbcnews.com/news/investigati…
[6] latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-…
[7] nbcnews.com/id/wbna5654550
[8] washingtonpost.com/archive/p…
[9] reddit.com/r/HistoryMemes/co…
[10] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexan…
[11] rferl.org/a/russia-litvinenk…
[12] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poison…
[13] news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/…
[14] crimeandinvestigation.co.uk/…–
– Google Search google.com/search?q=The+Chec…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026
The Chechen story is central in the Hamburg Cell plot. Does it indicate the involvement of FSB in the 9/11?
Litvinenko: Russia possessed a degree of subterranean influence over Al-Qaeda’s leadership.
AI Mode
No, the Hamburg Cell’s Chechen story does not indicate the involvement of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in the 9/11 attacks. Instead, it represents a pivotal, accidental detour in the hijackers’ path from local radicalization to joining al-Qaeda.
According to the official 9/11 Commission Report, the “Chechen story” unfolded through a sequence of verified events: [1, 2]
1. The Original Goal was Chechnya, Not America
In late 1999, core members of the Hamburg Cell—including Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—became intensely radicalized by videos of Russian military actions during the Second Chechen War. Their initial intent was exclusively to travel to Chechnya to fight alongside Muslim separatists against the Russian military. They had no known connection to al-Qaeda or any plans to attack the United States at that time. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
2. The Train Encounter
While traveling on a German train east toward their intended destination, the cell members had a chance encounter with an al-Qaeda operative named Khalid al-Masri. Al-Masri convinced them that traveling directly into Chechnya was logistically too difficult due to closed borders and heavy Russian security. [2, 7]
He redirected them to a Mauritanian businessman named Mohamedou Ould Slahi, who advised them to travel first to Afghanistan to receive formal military training before trying to enter Chechnya. [2, 8]
3. The Hijacking by al-Qaeda
Once the Hamburg Cell arrived at al-Qaeda training camps in Kandahar, Afghanistan, their path changed permanently. Osama bin Laden and his military commanders realized that these men possessed rare, highly valuable traits for a transnational plot: they were fluent in Western languages, educated, and comfortable living in European societies. [5, 9]
Bin Laden personally intercepted them, informed them that they were not needed in Chechnya, and instead recruited them to become the operational core of the “Planes Operation”—which eventually became the 9/11 attacks. [6, 10, 11]
Summary
The Chechen conflict served as the emotional catalyst for the Hamburg Cell’s radicalization, but the connection was adversarial to Russia. Intelligence agencies and historians view the Chechen angle as evidence of how decentralized extremist networks operated at the time, rather than as an indicator of an FSB state-sponsored conspiracy. [3, 5][1] en.wikipedia.org
[2] washingtonpost.com
[3] nbcnews.com
[4] refworld.org
[5] en.wikipedia.org
[6] washingtonpost.com
[7] en.wikipedia.org
[8] nbcnews.com
[9] latimes.com
[10] amazon.com
[11] en.wikipedia.org
–AI Overview
The “Chechen story” does not indicate any involvement of the Russian FSB in the September 11 attacks.
The connection between the Hamburg Cell and Chechnya is a well-documented chapter in the history of the 9/11 plot, but extensive investigations by Western intelligence and the 9/11 Commission Report have established that this path was driven entirely by chance and standard Al-Qaeda recruitment corridors, rather than Russian state orchestration. [1, 2, 3]
What is the “Chechen Story”?
In late 1999, the core members of the Hamburg Cell (Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah) were radicalized in Germany, largely driven by internet propaganda and videos detailing Russian military atrocities against Muslims in Chechnya. [4, 5]
They decided to leave Germany to fight alongside Muslim separatists in the Second Chechen War. However, the route to Chechnya was highly restricted. While on a train in Germany, they had a chance encounter with an Islamist operative named Khalid al-Masri. Al-Masri put them in contact with Mohamedou Ould Slahi (an Al-Qaeda facilitator based in Germany), who advised them that traveling directly to Chechnya was too difficult. Instead, Slahi instructed them to travel to Afghanistan via Pakistan to receive training first. Once they arrived in Al-Qaeda’s camps, Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed recognized their technical skills and Western language fluencies, explicitly redirecting them from the Chechen battlefield to lead the “Planes Operation” against the United States. [1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9]
Where Do the FSB Theories Come From?
The idea that the FSB had a hand in 9/11 stems primarily from the controversial claims of Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer who defected to the UK and was assassinated with polonium-210 in 2006. [10, 11]
Litvinenko publicly asserted that the Russian secret services routinely infiltrated and manipulated global terrorist networks. Specifically, he claimed that Al-Qaeda’s number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had been detained by the FSB in Dagestan in 1997 and underwent training under Russian control before being released. Litvinenko used this allegation to suggest that Russia possessed a degree of subterranean influence over Al-Qaeda’s leadership. [12, 13, 14]
Why This Does Not Prove FSB Involvement
Mainstream historians, geopolitical analysts, and counterterrorism experts uniformly reject the premise of Russian state involvement in 9/11 for several distinct reasons:Inadvertent Radicalization, Not Orchestration: The Hamburg Cell was angered by Russian actions in Chechnya. Their original intent was to kill Russian soldiers, making any alignment with the FSB logistically and ideologically impossible.
The “Chance Encounter” Reality: The 9/11 Commission Report painstakingly detailed that the cell’s pivot from Chechnya to Afghanistan was an accident of geography and happenstance networking within European Salafist circles, not a deliberate redirect by a state actor.
Absence of Evidence: No declassified Western intelligence, German investigative findings, or internal Al-Qaeda documents found in Afghanistan have ever produced evidence supporting Litvinenko’s theory or showing an FSB link to the Hamburg cell.
Geopolitical Consequence: Structurally, the 9/11 attacks were deeply damaging to Russia’s geopolitical posture in Central Asia, as they immediately resulted in the United States establishing military bases in former Soviet republics (like Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan)—an outcome the Kremlin vehemently opposed.Ultimately, the Hamburg Cell’s Chechen fixation serves as an example of how local regional conflicts in the 1990s acted as global accelerators for radicalization, feeding impressionable young men directly into Al-Qaeda’s pre-existing logistics pipeline. [3, 5]
AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hambur…
[2] washingtonpost.com/archive/p…
[3] nbcnews.com/id/wbna5654550
[4] refworld.org/reference/resea…
[5] nbcnews.com/news/investigati…
[6] latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-…
[7] nbcnews.com/id/wbna5654550
[8] washingtonpost.com/archive/p…
[9] reddit.com/r/HistoryMemes/co…
[10] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexan…
[11] rferl.org/a/russia-litvinenk…
[12] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poison…
[13] news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/…
[14] crimeandinvestigation.co.uk/…–
– Google Search google.com/search?q=The+Chec…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026
Instead, it represents a pivotal, accidental detour in the hijackers’ path from local radicalization to joining al-Qaeda.According to the official 9/11 Commission Report, the
AI Mode reply for The Chechen story is central in the Hamburg Cell plot. Does it indicate the involvement of FSB in the 9/11? Rather, historical evidence and official investigations show that the core members of the Hamburg cell—including Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—were original
FSB OPERATIONS OUTSIDE RUSSIA thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026
FSB OPERATIONS OUTSIDE RUSSIA – Google Search google.com/search?num=10&new…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026
#FSB #Russia #FBI
FSB OPERATIONS OUTSIDE RUSSIA
While Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) is primarily a domestic security and counterintelligence agency, it has significantly expanded its footprint to conduct extensive foreign intelligence, sabotage, and assassination operations globally. [1, 2]
1. Institutional Architecture: The “Fifth Service”
The legal authority for the FSB to operate outside Russia is enshrined in the Russian Federal Laws “On Foreign Intelligence” and “On the Federal Security Service”. These external operations are spearheaded by a dedicated wing within its structure: [3]The Fifth Service: Officially named the Service of Operational Information and International Relations (SOIMS), this arm is tasked with external human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). [3]
Leadership: As of 2024, the Fifth Service is headed by Alexei Komkov, who took over from Sergei Beseda. Beseda had led the unit since 2009 but faced intense scrutiny following the FSB’s intelligence failures during the lead-up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. [3]
The “Near Abroad”: Historically, the FSB’s Department for Operational Information (DOI) focused heavily on compiling data and conducting counterintelligence across former Soviet states (the CIS countries), taking over the mantle of the KGB’s old Fifth Service. [4]2. Operational Methods and Cover
The FSB utilizes both deep-cover and official channels to embed its personnel abroad:Unofficial Cover: The DOI aggressively deploys operatives using non-official cover, placing personnel inside foreign commercial companies, educational institutions, non-governmental organizations, and civilian government branches. [3]
Diplomatic Cover: The Department of International Cooperation (UMS) places official FSB representatives directly inside Russian embassies. These operatives liaise with foreign law enforcement but also leverage ordinary diplomatic positions to shield officers executing subversive operations. [3]
“Intelligence from the Territory”: A preferred method involves initiating contact and recruiting targets (both foreign and Russian citizens) while they are physically within Russian territory, establishing long-term informant relationships before they travel abroad. [5]3. Recent Direct Action: Sabotage, Cyber, and Assassination
Intelligence analysts and recent Western indictments highlight a shift toward highly aggressive, sometimes reckless external operations that bypass traditional statecraft in favor of asymmetric warfare: [6]Transnational Murder-for-Hire Plots: In September 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a major indictment charging five suspected Russian intelligence operatives. The unsealed filings detailed a sophisticated “RIS Network” that hired assets within the United States—including a surveillance asset in Brooklyn, New York—offering up to $40,000 to “eliminate” or “disappear” a prominent Russian dissident living in Washington, D.C.
European Infrastructure Sabotage: The same September 2026 U.S. indictment detailed a coordinated criminal network operating in Europe. The network has targeted civilian and military infrastructure across European nations aligned with Ukraine, executing arson attacks, localized acts of terrorism, and surveillance on critical logistics nodes.
Proxy and “Misfit” Recruitment: Rather than relying purely on highly trained elite officers for field tasks, the FSB increasingly recruits societal misfits, criminal proxies, or foreign nationals via encrypted platforms like Telegram. These assets are paid small bounties to photograph rail lines, plant localized explosives, or conduct low-level arson to trigger civil unrest and paranoia across the West.
Global Influence and Cyber Warfare: The FSB is repeatedly linked to state-sponsored cyberattacks, critical infrastructure penetration, and digital disinformation campaigns designed to destabilize foreign political systems and weaken allied support for Ukraine. [1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10][1] congress.gov
[2] congress.gov
[3] tandfonline.com
[4] en.wikipedia.org
[5] raport.valisluureamet.ee
[6] youtube.com
[7] justice.gov
[8] npr.org
[9] rferl.org
[10] youtube.comThe Federal Security Service (FSB) conducts foreign operations through the Fifth Service (Service for Operational Information and International Relations) and military counterintelligence (VKR), extending beyond domestic security into the “near abroad,” assassinations, sabotage, and proxy recruitment. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Core Mandate & Legal BasisCIS / “Near Abroad”: Tasked with intelligence-gathering in former Soviet states where the SVR faces legal limits under intergovernmental agreements (Article 8 of the Federal Law on the FSB).
Fifth Service: Compiles regional intelligence and shapes policy advice (notably prior to the 2022 Ukraine invasion).
Special Forces: Units like Vympel hold remits for black and covert operations internationally. [1, 2, 5]Scope of External Operations
Dissident Surveillance & Assassinations: Targeting Russian opposition figures in Europe and the U.S. (e.g., Department of Justice indictments exposing proxy recruitment and murder-for-hire plots in New York/DC).
Sabotage & Infrastructure Attacks: Establishing criminal/proxy networks to strike civilian and military infrastructure in Western-aligned European nations supporting Ukraine.
Organized Crime (RBOC) Utilization: Partnering with regional gangs and money-laundering groups as low-cost alternatives following embassy intelligence expulsions.
Counterintelligence & Detentions: Operating cross-border crackdowns or detentions (e.g., Baku operations). [1]AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federa…
[2] congress.gov/crs-product/IF1…
[3] justice.gov/usao-sdny/media/…
[4] raport.valisluureamet.ee/202…
[5] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_…
[6] rferl.org/a/us-charges-five-…
[7] newlinesinstitute.org/global…–
– Google Search google.com/search?q=FSB+OPER…
–— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026
AI Mode Conversation: FSB OPERATIONS OUTSIDE RUSSIAFSB OPERATIONS OUTSIDE RUSSIAAI Mode reply for FSB OPERATIONS OUTSIDE RUSSIAWhile Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) is primarily a domestic security and counterintelligence agency, it has significantly expanded its footprint to conduct extensi