The world is in the grip of a multi-crisis triggered by the swirl of oil prices, unpredictable bond yields, rising interest rates, food stress, worries about AI and a massive EL Nino weather event.
Donald Trump thinks he can bring it all under control, but has he reached the limits of his powers?
Read the latest edition of Cables ⤵️
telegraph.co.uk/newsletters/…— @Telegraph Sep 16, 2026
Day: September 16, 2026
. Over the span of 25 years, the Kremlin has evolved from a partner in the global war on terror into an active perpetrator of state terrorism and an ally to transnational terror networks.🏛️ The Post-9/11 Illusion: Tactful CooperationImmediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Russian Presi
The term
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that any war between Russia and Europe would be “very short” if European countries attacked Moscow.
He also said Russia would view the deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine as a declaration of war.
— @KyivPost Sep 16, 2026
#CIA #FBI #Mossad
The same old Russian State Terrorism
x.com/mikenov/status/2100231…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #Russia #StateTerrorism #Putin
9/11, October 7, and the RUSSIAN STATE TERRORISM
Gemini:
Global Security and Russian Hybrid Warfare share.gemini.google/01C8vwgm…
AI Mode
The same strategic framework, identical agencies, and interlocking networks of non-state actors to achieve the foreign policy objectives.
The perspective that connects 9/11, October 7, and the contemporary actions of the Russian state revolves around a shared operational doctrine—or “kontseptsiya” (концепция)—built on asymmetrical warfare, state-sponsored proxies, and psychological terror. [1, 2]
While Western analysts historical treated 9/11 (executed by Al-Qaeda) and October 7 (executed by Hamas) as distinct acts of non-state global jihadism, geopolitical experts increasingly argue that Russia uses the same strategic framework, identical agencies, and interlocking networks of non-state actors to achieve its foreign policy objectives. [3, 4, 5, 6]
1. The “Kontseptsiya”: Asymmetrical Terror as a State Tool
The structural backbone linking these events is the Soviet-inherited doctrine of “Active Measures” (Aktivnye Meropriyatiya) and asymmetrical warfare. The concept dictates that when conventional military power cannot directly match adversaries (like NATO or the West), the state must utilize asymmetric tools—subversion, disinformation, sabotage, and proxy terror—to fracture enemy cohesion. [1, 6]The Strategic Goal: The ultimate objective across these iterations is not a military victory on paper, but the strategic exhaustion and internal destabilization of Western democracies. [3, 7]
Blairing the Lines: Russia’s modern execution of this doctrine blurs the boundary between domestic policing, foreign intelligence, and state-backed terror. Whether utilizing continuous drone terror against civilian populations in Kyiv or maintaining strategic diplomatic backchannels with Hamas and its chief sponsor, Iran, the overarching concept remains constant: weaponized instability. [2, 3, 6, 7, 8]2. The Same Actors: Interlocking Proxies
A core tenet of this perspective is that Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and the Russian state are not isolated actors, but nodes in a continuous web of anti-Western revisionism. [6, 7]
The Soviet/Russian Lineage: Historically, the KGB trained and funded early generations of Middle Eastern militant factions. Today, Moscow hosts Hamas delegations for official diplomatic visits, maintains a military alliance with Iran, and protects networks that directly facilitate asymmetric strikes against Western-aligned democratic nations. [1, 6, 7, 9]
Proxy Deployment: By outsourcing the kinetic violence of terrorism to regional actors like Hamas, Hezbollah, or mercenary syndicates, Russia achieves plausible deniability while exploiting the geopolitical fallout (such as the diversion of Western military aid away from Ukraine). [1, 6, 7]3. The Same Agencies: The Architecture of Subversion
The institutional apparatus driving these operations relies on the same direct successors of the Soviet security state:
The FSB (Federal Security Service): Primarily focused internally but increasingly active in regional subversion, the FSB specializes in orchestrating domestic “false flags” and terror management to solidify state control.
The GRU (Russian Military Intelligence): The GRU serves as the kinetic arm, orchestrating sabotage, weapon transfers to proxy states, and direct asymmetrical interventions abroad.
The SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service): This agency executes the psychological and informational operations (maskirovka) that frame acts of brutal terrorism as “resistance” or “regional blowback,” systematically muddying the international legal waters. [3, 5, 9, 10, 11]In essence, whether through the horrific events of 9/11, the mass terror of October 7, or the relentless daily targeting of European civilians, the underlying architecture of subversion employs the same fundamental agencies, networks, and conceptual playbooks. [2, 3, 4, 5, 8]
If you want to explore this continuity deeper, let me know if you would like to look into:
The specific KGB historical archives regarding Middle Eastern proxy networks.
How the Gerasimov Doctrine formalizes these concepts in modern Russian military strategy.
A direct comparison of Russian state tactics in Chechnya and Syria to contemporary attacks.[1] en.wikipedia.org
[2] washingtoninstitute.org
[3] icct.nl
[4] iwm.org.uk
[5] academic.oup.com
[6] academicworks.cuny.edu
[7] foi.se
[8] facebook.com
[9] ctc.westpoint.edu
[10] brookings.edu
[11] rferl.org– Google Search google.com/search?q=9%2F11%2…
Pic.: 9/11, October 7, and the current state of the RUSSIAN STATE TERRORISM
cfr.org/articles/twenty-five…— https://x.com/mikenov/status/2100231870701060131— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026
#Russia #StateTerrorism #Putin
9/11, October 7, and the RUSSIAN STATE TERRORISM
Gemini:
Global Security and Russian Hybrid Warfare share.gemini.google/01C8vwgm…
AI Mode
The same strategic framework, identical agencies, and interlocking networks of non-state actors to achieve the foreign policy objectives.
The perspective that connects 9/11, October 7, and the contemporary actions of the Russian state revolves around a shared operational doctrine—or “kontseptsiya” (концепция)—built on asymmetrical warfare, state-sponsored proxies, and psychological terror. [1, 2]
While Western analysts historical treated 9/11 (executed by Al-Qaeda) and October 7 (executed by Hamas) as distinct acts of non-state global jihadism, geopolitical experts increasingly argue that Russia uses the same strategic framework, identical agencies, and interlocking networks of non-state actors to achieve its foreign policy objectives. [3, 4, 5, 6]
1. The “Kontseptsiya”: Asymmetrical Terror as a State Tool
The structural backbone linking these events is the Soviet-inherited doctrine of “Active Measures” (Aktivnye Meropriyatiya) and asymmetrical warfare. The concept dictates that when conventional military power cannot directly match adversaries (like NATO or the West), the state must utilize asymmetric tools—subversion, disinformation, sabotage, and proxy terror—to fracture enemy cohesion. [1, 6]The Strategic Goal: The ultimate objective across these iterations is not a military victory on paper, but the strategic exhaustion and internal destabilization of Western democracies. [3, 7]
Blairing the Lines: Russia’s modern execution of this doctrine blurs the boundary between domestic policing, foreign intelligence, and state-backed terror. Whether utilizing continuous drone terror against civilian populations in Kyiv or maintaining strategic diplomatic backchannels with Hamas and its chief sponsor, Iran, the overarching concept remains constant: weaponized instability. [2, 3, 6, 7, 8]2. The Same Actors: Interlocking Proxies
A core tenet of this perspective is that Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and the Russian state are not isolated actors, but nodes in a continuous web of anti-Western revisionism. [6, 7]
The Soviet/Russian Lineage: Historically, the KGB trained and funded early generations of Middle Eastern militant factions. Today, Moscow hosts Hamas delegations for official diplomatic visits, maintains a military alliance with Iran, and protects networks that directly facilitate asymmetric strikes against Western-aligned democratic nations. [1, 6, 7, 9]
Proxy Deployment: By outsourcing the kinetic violence of terrorism to regional actors like Hamas, Hezbollah, or mercenary syndicates, Russia achieves plausible deniability while exploiting the geopolitical fallout (such as the diversion of Western military aid away from Ukraine). [1, 6, 7]3. The Same Agencies: The Architecture of Subversion
The institutional apparatus driving these operations relies on the same direct successors of the Soviet security state:
The FSB (Federal Security Service): Primarily focused internally but increasingly active in regional subversion, the FSB specializes in orchestrating domestic “false flags” and terror management to solidify state control.
The GRU (Russian Military Intelligence): The GRU serves as the kinetic arm, orchestrating sabotage, weapon transfers to proxy states, and direct asymmetrical interventions abroad.
The SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service): This agency executes the psychological and informational operations (maskirovka) that frame acts of brutal terrorism as “resistance” or “regional blowback,” systematically muddying the international legal waters. [3, 5, 9, 10, 11]In essence, whether through the horrific events of 9/11, the mass terror of October 7, or the relentless daily targeting of European civilians, the underlying architecture of subversion employs the same fundamental agencies, networks, and conceptual playbooks. [2, 3, 4, 5, 8]
If you want to explore this continuity deeper, let me know if you would like to look into:
The specific KGB historical archives regarding Middle Eastern proxy networks.
How the Gerasimov Doctrine formalizes these concepts in modern Russian military strategy.
A direct comparison of Russian state tactics in Chechnya and Syria to contemporary attacks.[1] en.wikipedia.org
[2] washingtoninstitute.org
[3] icct.nl
[4] iwm.org.uk
[5] academic.oup.com
[6] academicworks.cuny.edu
[7] foi.se
[8] facebook.com
[9] ctc.westpoint.edu
[10] brookings.edu
[11] rferl.org– Google Search google.com/search?q=9%2F11%2…
Pic.: 9/11, October 7, and the current state of the RUSSIAN STATE TERRORISM
cfr.org/articles/twenty-five…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tells CBS News’ @aidan_stretch that his motivation to keep fighting comes from his love for Ukraine and his belief that “the truth is on our side.” Zelenskyy says he knows he makes mistakes while making difficult decisions every day, but remains committed to working for his country as long as Ukrainians want him to.
Read more from our interview with President Zelenskyy here: cbsn.ws/4AeYmjl
Video
— @CBSNews Sep 16, 2026
#Russia #StateTerrorism #Putin
Global Security and Russian Hybrid Warfare share.gemini.google/01C8vwgm…The same strategic framework, identical agencies, and interlocking networks of non-state actors to achieve the foreign policy objectives.
9/11, October 7, and the current state of the RUSSIAN STATE TERRORISM: same: “contseptsiya”, same actors, same agencies
The perspective that connects 9/11, October 7, and the contemporary actions of the Russian state revolves around a shared operational doctrine—or “kontseptsiya” (концепция)—built on asymmetrical warfare, state-sponsored proxies, and psychological terror. [1, 2]
While Western analysts historical treated 9/11 (executed by Al-Qaeda) and October 7 (executed by Hamas) as distinct acts of non-state global jihadism, geopolitical experts increasingly argue that Russia uses the same strategic framework, identical agencies, and interlocking networks of non-state actors to achieve its foreign policy objectives. [3, 4, 5, 6]
1. The “Kontseptsiya”: Asymmetrical Terror as a State Tool
The structural backbone linking these events is the Soviet-inherited doctrine of “Active Measures” (Aktivnye Meropriyatiya) and asymmetrical warfare. The concept dictates that when conventional military power cannot directly match adversaries (like NATO or the West), the state must utilize asymmetric tools—subversion, disinformation, sabotage, and proxy terror—to fracture enemy cohesion. [1, 6]The Strategic Goal: The ultimate objective across these iterations is not a military victory on paper, but the strategic exhaustion and internal destabilization of Western democracies. [3, 7]
Blairing the Lines: Russia’s modern execution of this doctrine blurs the boundary between domestic policing, foreign intelligence, and state-backed terror. Whether utilizing continuous drone terror against civilian populations in Kyiv or maintaining strategic diplomatic backchannels with Hamas and its chief sponsor, Iran, the overarching concept remains constant: weaponized instability. [2, 3, 6, 7, 8]2. The Same Actors: Interlocking Proxies
A core tenet of this perspective is that Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and the Russian state are not isolated actors, but nodes in a continuous web of anti-Western revisionism. [6, 7]
The Soviet/Russian Lineage: Historically, the KGB trained and funded early generations of Middle Eastern militant factions. Today, Moscow hosts Hamas delegations for official diplomatic visits, maintains a military alliance with Iran, and protects networks that directly facilitate asymmetric strikes against Western-aligned democratic nations. [1, 6, 7, 9]
Proxy Deployment: By outsourcing the kinetic violence of terrorism to regional actors like Hamas, Hezbollah, or mercenary syndicates, Russia achieves plausible deniability while exploiting the geopolitical fallout (such as the diversion of Western military aid away from Ukraine). [1, 6, 7]3. The Same Agencies: The Architecture of Subversion
The institutional apparatus driving these operations relies on the same direct successors of the Soviet security state:
The FSB (Federal Security Service): Primarily focused internally but increasingly active in regional subversion, the FSB specializes in orchestrating domestic “false flags” and terror management to solidify state control.
The GRU (Russian Military Intelligence): The GRU serves as the kinetic arm, orchestrating sabotage, weapon transfers to proxy states, and direct asymmetrical interventions abroad.
The SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service): This agency executes the psychological and informational operations (maskirovka) that frame acts of brutal terrorism as “resistance” or “regional blowback,” systematically muddying the international legal waters. [3, 5, 9, 10, 11]In essence, whether through the horrific events of 9/11, the mass terror of October 7, or the relentless daily targeting of European civilians, the underlying architecture of subversion employs the same fundamental agencies, networks, and conceptual playbooks. [2, 3, 4, 5, 8]
If you want to explore this continuity deeper, let me know if you would like to look into:
The specific KGB historical archives regarding Middle Eastern proxy networks.
How the Gerasimov Doctrine formalizes these concepts in modern Russian military strategy.
A direct comparison of Russian state tactics in Chechnya and Syria to contemporary attacks.[1] en.wikipedia.org
[2] washingtoninstitute.org
[3] icct.nl
[4] iwm.org.uk
[5] academic.oup.com
[6] academicworks.cuny.edu
[7] foi.se
[8] facebook.com
[9] ctc.westpoint.edu
[10] brookings.edu
[11] rferl.org– Google Search google.com/search?q=9%2F11%2…
Pic.: 9/11, October 7, and the current state of the RUSSIAN STATE TERRORISM
cfr.org/articles/twenty-five…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026
Global Security and Russian Hybrid Warfare share.gemini.google/01C8vwgm…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026
9/11, October 7, and the current state of the RUSSIAN STATE TERRORISM: same: “contseptsiya”, same actors, same agencies
The perspective that connects 9/11, October 7, and the contemporary actions of the Russian state revolves around a shared operational doctrine—or “kontseptsiya” (концепция)—built on asymmetrical warfare, state-sponsored proxies, and psychological terror. [1, 2]
While Western analysts historical treated 9/11 (executed by Al-Qaeda) and October 7 (executed by Hamas) as distinct acts of non-state global jihadism, geopolitical experts increasingly argue that Russia uses the same strategic framework, identical agencies, and interlocking networks of non-state actors to achieve its foreign policy objectives. [3, 4, 5, 6]
1. The “Kontseptsiya”: Asymmetrical Terror as a State Tool
The structural backbone linking these events is the Soviet-inherited doctrine of “Active Measures” (Aktivnye Meropriyatiya) and asymmetrical warfare. The concept dictates that when conventional military power cannot directly match adversaries (like NATO or the West), the state must utilize asymmetric tools—subversion, disinformation, sabotage, and proxy terror—to fracture enemy cohesion. [1, 6]The Strategic Goal: The ultimate objective across these iterations is not a military victory on paper, but the strategic exhaustion and internal destabilization of Western democracies. [3, 7]
Blairing the Lines: Russia’s modern execution of this doctrine blurs the boundary between domestic policing, foreign intelligence, and state-backed terror. Whether utilizing continuous drone terror against civilian populations in Kyiv or maintaining strategic diplomatic backchannels with Hamas and its chief sponsor, Iran, the overarching concept remains constant: weaponized instability. [2, 3, 6, 7, 8]2. The Same Actors: Interlocking Proxies
A core tenet of this perspective is that Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and the Russian state are not isolated actors, but nodes in a continuous web of anti-Western revisionism. [6, 7]
The Soviet/Russian Lineage: Historically, the KGB trained and funded early generations of Middle Eastern militant factions. Today, Moscow hosts Hamas delegations for official diplomatic visits, maintains a military alliance with Iran, and protects networks that directly facilitate asymmetric strikes against Western-aligned democratic nations. [1, 6, 7, 9]
Proxy Deployment: By outsourcing the kinetic violence of terrorism to regional actors like Hamas, Hezbollah, or mercenary syndicates, Russia achieves plausible deniability while exploiting the geopolitical fallout (such as the diversion of Western military aid away from Ukraine). [1, 6, 7]3. The Same Agencies: The Architecture of Subversion
The institutional apparatus driving these operations relies on the same direct successors of the Soviet security state:
The FSB (Federal Security Service): Primarily focused internally but increasingly active in regional subversion, the FSB specializes in orchestrating domestic “false flags” and terror management to solidify state control.
The GRU (Russian Military Intelligence): The GRU serves as the kinetic arm, orchestrating sabotage, weapon transfers to proxy states, and direct asymmetrical interventions abroad.
The SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service): This agency executes the psychological and informational operations (maskirovka) that frame acts of brutal terrorism as “resistance” or “regional blowback,” systematically muddying the international legal waters. [3, 5, 9, 10, 11]In essence, whether through the horrific events of 9/11, the mass terror of October 7, or the relentless daily targeting of European civilians, the underlying architecture of subversion employs the same fundamental agencies, networks, and conceptual playbooks. [2, 3, 4, 5, 8]
If you want to explore this continuity deeper, let me know if you would like to look into:
The specific KGB historical archives regarding Middle Eastern proxy networks.
How the Gerasimov Doctrine formalizes these concepts in modern Russian military strategy.
A direct comparison of Russian state tactics in Chechnya and Syria to contemporary attacks.[1] en.wikipedia.org
[2] washingtoninstitute.org
[3] icct.nl
[4] iwm.org.uk
[5] academic.oup.com
[6] academicworks.cuny.edu
[7] foi.se
[8] facebook.com
[9] ctc.westpoint.edu
[10] brookings.edu
[11] rferl.org– Google Search google.com/search?q=9%2F11%2…
Pic.: 9/11, October 7, and the current state of the RUSSIAN STATE TERRORISM
cfr.org/articles/twenty-five…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 16, 2026